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Computer network defense systems should be sufficiently integrated to pull data from 
any information source, model an expert cyber analyst’s decision process, continuously 
adapt to an evolving cyber threat environment, and amalgamate with industry standard 
network hardware. Unfortunately, cyber defense systems are generally stovepipe 
solutions that do not natively integrate disparate network systems. Correlation engines are 
generally limited in capability, extensibility, and do not evolve with a dynamic cyber 
threatscape. Current network defense systems mitigate known vulnerabilities, but 
effective methods of traffic analysis capable of detecting unknown exploits and 
identifying advanced persistent threats have yet to be developed. Expert analysts can 
isolate threats by manually aggregating data sources and distinguishing patterns that 
indicate a compromise, but there are insufficient skilled analysts available to combat the 
problem. This work demonstrates a process control configuration that can emulate the 
investigative process of a human cyber security expert into a pseudo cognitive apparatus 
capable of accessing several network available data sources, determining a network 
threat, and terminating a connection, in minutes. The investigative process to detect a 
PHPMyAdmin attack and issue a response was entirely configured in a vector relational 
data modeling environment. The configuration could detect and respond to multi-part 
threat specifications. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis describes an information modeling approach to aggregating any 
number of cybersecurity systems into a common cyber picture, modeling the decision-
making of expert cyber analysts and automating system behavior. 
A semantics-based executable information model is presented within a 
configurable information modeling framework as a method for the rapid development 
and deployment of a secure, automated, all-source cyber threat analysis and response 
capability. The continuous evolution of advanced persistent threats (APT) and the 
increase in number of cyber-attacks continue to outpace cyber defense due to limitations 
in technology, funding and human resources.1 The current approach to network security 
is disparate and ad hoc, and human dependent, or at best, consists of a rigid software 
solution, many times proprietary.2 It addresses known threat types, which, in turn, starts 
the threat evolution cycle again yielding new threats. Vector Relational Data Modeling 
(VRDM) was used to configure an information specification to aggregate network 
available data from servers and systems as object components, execute decision making 
and enable semi-sentient system behavior and processes for near real-time computer 
network defense. Cyber protection systems, information and operational process were 
researched and incorporated into an information configuration for decision making and 
subsequent process execution in an iterative fashion. This approach offered a viable 
                                                 
1 Chris Sanders and Jason Smith, Applied Network Security Monitoring (Waltham, MA: Elsevier, 
2014), 6; Executive Office of the President of the United States, Fiscal Year 2012 Report to Congress on 
the Implementation of The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (Washington, DC: White 
House, March 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/egov_docs/fy12_fisma.pdf; 
“Cyber Security Overview,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed April 29, 2014, 
https://www.dhs.gov/cybersecurity-overview; Tom Colburn, “Memo to Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs: FISMA Spending, 
Historical Trends,” Congressional Research Service, accessed July 29, 2014, 
http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public//index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=33d705f2-6629-4ee2-8be0-
50965da651b3; Karen Evans and Franklin Reeder, “A Human Capital Crisis in Cyber Security: Technical 
Proficiency Matters,” CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency, November, 15, 2010, 
http://csis.org/files/publication/101111_Evans_HumanCapital_Web.pdf. 
2 “Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation,” Department of Homeland Security, accessed April 28, 
2014, http://www.dhs.gov/cdm; Toby Kohlenberg et al., Snort IDS and IPS Toolkit (Burlington, MA: 
Syngress, 2007), 18; Chris Sanders and Jason Smith, Applied Network Security Monitoring (Waltham, MA: 
Elsevier, 2014), 13, 424; Winn Schwartau, Time Based Security (Seminole, FL: Interpact Press, 1999), 
113; Rafeeq U. Rehman, Intrusion Detection with Snort (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 1. 
 xx 
solution within a DOD network certified framework capable of keeping pace with the 
cyber threat evolution cycle. 
This cyber domain use-case information specification was configured within the 
Global Information Network Architecture (GINA), an executable, component-based, 
platform agnostic, and model-driven framework.3 The framework provides the necessary 
data, information, knowledge, and interoperability4; and is a viable approach to devise an 
information configuration that enables services for a cyber threat response (CTR) system 
of systems. The salient properties of this network-based decision-making system 
emphasized the central role of actionable information and emergent knowledge processes 
in a dynamic environment. From a system design and development perspective, the 
defining property of information-driven Enterprise Knowledge Platform is that 
requirements are not always identified in advance but rather emerge from the 
environment. In the case of a cyber threat response (CTR) system this demands an agile 
system development methodology with a flexible semantic system interoperability 
approach. 
A cyber threat response configuration (CTRC) specification for detecting and 
responding to PHP Hypertext Preprocessor (PHP) attacks as a network environment 
implementation with a concept of operations (CONOP) automated analysis is 
demonstrated in this thesis. This CONOP is an exemplar of the application of an 
executable information configuration to perform suspicion based intrusion detection 
through integrated, interoperating information technologies functioning within a 
complex, heterogeneous system with a dynamic topology. A test of the core concept of a 
                                                 
3 Daniel Dolk et al., “GINA: System Interoperability for Enabling Smart Mobile System Services in 
Network Decision Support Systems,” IEEE, accessed July 21, 2014, doi: 10.1109/HICSS.2012.293, 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6149063&isnumber=6148595; Thomas S. 
Anderson and Frank Busalacchi, “Understanding Interoperability and the GINA advantage,” USACE 
ERDC CRREL, BKT, January 2013; Kenneth A. Stewart, “Researchers, Commanders Partner on Potential 
Networking Revolution,” (Naval Postgraduate School, November 2, 2012), 
http://www.nps.edu/About/News/Researchers-Commanders-Partner-on-Potential-Networking-
Revolution.html. 
4 Gary Langford, “GINA Network-Centric Assemble-to-Description Architecture,” (Naval 




weighted decision configuration demonstrated that a VRDM configuration could detect 
and respond to multi-part threat specifications. 
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Cybersecurity analysts are unable to keep pace with modern cyber threats, 
evidenced by cyber espionage going unnoticed for years.1 Victims of cybercrime are 
sometimes unaware that an attack occurred until months later.2 Compromises generally 
take 87 days to detect and around seven days to contain.3 Much of the problem can be 
attributed to the lack of available intellectual capital to combat the problem.4 Hackers 
have used this window of opportunity to download terabytes of data from military 
networks.5 A new approach to cyber defense is needed to mitigate these attacks. 
The persistent vulnerability in cybersecurity has been attributed to the lack of 
available intellectual capital to combat the constantly evolving problem.6 That is, current 
approaches to specific threats are brittle, human intensive, and do not scale well to meet 
the changing malicious tactics, nor do they utilize the potential power of network 
available data. A new approach discussed here is Vector Relational Data Modeling 
                                                 
1 Siobhan Gorman “Chinese Hackers Suspected in Long-Term Nortel Breach,” Wall Street Journal, 
February 14, 2012. 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203363504577187502201577054?mg=reno64-
wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB100014240529702033635045771875022015
77054.html; “APT1: Exposing One of China's Cyber Espionage Units” Mandiant, February 18, 2013, 
http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf; Ministry of Justice of Georgia, “Cyber 
Espionage against Georgian Government” paper presented at Symposium on Cyber Incidents and Critical 
Infrastructure Protection, Tallin, Estonia, June 18, 2012, 
http://dea.gov.ge/uploads/CERT%20DOCS/Cyber%20Espionage.pdf; Martin C. Libicki, “A Matter of 
Degree: Who Can Authorize a Cyberattack?” RAND blog, January 8, 2013, 
http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/01/a-matter-of-degree-who-can-authorize-a-cyberattack.html. 
2 Cybersecurity: Responding to the Threat of Cyber Crime and Terrorism, United States Senate (April 
12, 2011) (statement of Gordon Snow, Assistant Director, Cyber Division, Washington, D.C.), 
http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/cybersecurity-responding-to-the-threat-of-cyber-crime-and-terrorism.   
3 Trustwave, “2014 Trustwave Global Security Report” (Chicago: Trustwave, 2014), 
http://www.secretservice.gov/Trustwave_WP_Global_Security_Report_2014.pdf.  
4 Karen Evans and Franklin Reeder, “A Human Capital Crisis in Cyber security: Technical Proficiency 
Matters,” CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency, November, 15, 2010, 
http://csis.org/files/publication/101111_Evans_HumanCapital_Web.pdf. 
5 “Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, last 
modified March 10, 2014, 
http://csis.org/files/publication/140310_Significant_Cyber_Incidents_Since_2006.pdf.  
6 Karen Evans and Franklin Reeder, “A Human Capital Crisis in Cyber security: Technical Proficiency 
Matters,” CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency, November, 15, 2010, 
http://csis.org/files/publication/101111_Evans_HumanCapital_Web.pdf. 
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(VRDM), an information modeling approach that models the behavior of a system 
through a configurable specification, and has the attributes that can change the cyber 
battlescape. These attributes include being data standards agnostic, utilizing expert 
systems and information as component objects, making data actionable through decision-
making, and specifying and executing processes. 
A. RESEARCH MOTIVATION 
Modern computer intelligence is insufficient to characterize unknown and 
sophisticated cyber threats.7 As a result, human analysts are necessary to investigate 
cyber threat events to determine impact.8 This is because no one security product will 
ever exist capable of impenetrable security.9 A combination of systems is necessary for a 
comprehensive security posture.10
 
Analysts generally investigate cyber threat events 
through the use of multiple information sources with a subjective methodology, but “a 
codified, systematic analysis process” would contribute immensely to the cyber threat 
investigative procedure.11  
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop an executable information configuration 
that can implement a cyber threat analyst’s investigative process to identify cyber-attacks, 
distinguish false positives, and mitigate cyber intrusions in near real time. The scope of 
the work entails 
 Defining traditional computer network defense 
 Understanding the modern threat space 
                                                 
7 Chris Sanders and Jason Smith, Applied Network Security Monitoring (Waltham, MA: Elsevier, 
2014), 6. 
8 Toby Kohlenberg et al. , Snort IDS and IPS Toolkit (Burlington, MA: Syngress, 2007), 18; Chris 
Sanders and Jason Smith, Applied Network Security Monitoring (Waltham, MA: Elsevier, 2014), 13, 424. 
9 Winn Schwartau, Time Based Security (Seminole, FL: Interpact Press, 1999), 113. 
10 Rafeeq U. Rehman, Intrusion Detection with Snort (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 
1; Winn Schwartau, Time Based Security (Seminole, FL: Interpact Press, 1999), 113. 
11 Chris Sanders and Jason Smith, Applied Network Security Monitoring (Waltham, MA: Elsevier, 
2014), 422. 
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 Using component technologies 
o Apache 
o Snort  
o VRDM 
A prototype configuration that can rapidly extend to adapt to the changing 
landscape of cyber threats where we most need to be responsive is presented. An 
experimental interconnection of Windows event logs, Linux syslogs, Apache web logs, 
network scanner, and Snort packet captures is documented to determine the feasibility of 
using Vector Relational Data Modeling (VRDM) as a means of aggregating multiple 
cybersecurity systems. A process control configuration was derived to emulate the human 
investigative process, and determine appropriate responses to cyber threats. 
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
This thesis consists of five chapters and appendices. Chapters I and II contain the 
introduction, a literature review that surveys cybersecurity threats, defense technologies, 
and implications, and a thorough examination of VRDM and its implementation in the 
GINA framework that is required to understand this thesis. The Cyber Threat Response 
Configuration is presented as an automated capability to reduce the time required to 
mitigate PHPMyAdmin cyber threats in Chapter III. The test and discussion, conclusion, 
and recommendations for further work are in Chapter IV and V. The appendices contain 
details on configuration of the various component technologies that were employed.   
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In this chapter, a broad review of the state of cyber security, packet analysis, 
cyber protection technology, data analysis methodologies, computer network defense 
procedure, systems integration, and VRDM is presented.  
B. CYBER THREATSCAPE 
The Federal government is attacked thousands of times a day in cyberspace.12 
Responsibility for protection against these threats was promulgated to federal agencies 
“commensurate with the risk and magnitude” in 2002.13 Compliance “commensurate 
with threat risk and magnitude” can be measured relative to the estimated $6B investment 
in Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM), overseen by the Department of 
Homeland Security in 2013.14 Blanket Purchase Agreements with 17 industry partners 
accents the diversity of security solutions in the fragmented market.15 Potential for large 
purchase agreements attracted personnel from large corporate firms such as IBM, 
McAfee, RSA, and Symantec who gave government attendees “the information they 
would need to choose the best products and services.”16 The number of choices presented 
during phase one of the CDM award highlights the notion that best practices for network 
security are still being developed.  
                                                 
12 Cybersecurity: Next Steps to Protect Our Critical Infrastructure: Hearing Before the Committee on 
Commerce Science and Transportation, United States Senate, 111
th
 Cong. 2 (February 23, 2010) (statement 
of Vice Admiral Michael McConnell, USN (Retired), Executive Vice President, National Security 
Business, Booz Allen Hamilton), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111shrg57888/pdf/CHRG-
111shrg57888.pdf,18. 
13 Information Security, Federal Agency Responsibilities, 44 U.S. Code § 3544. 
14 General Services Administration, “Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation,” last reviewed, 
September 18, 2014, http://www.gsa.gov/cdm. 
15 Department of Homeland Security, “Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation,” accessed April 28, 
2014, http://www.dhs.gov/cdm. 
16 SANS (Systems Administration Network and Security), “Using the DHS Continuous Diagnostics 




U.S. government information technology security spending increased from $5.5B 
in 2006 to $14.6B in 2012 “yet cyber intrusions and attacks have increased 
dramatically.”17 Cybersecurity legislation, smart card authentication, continuous 
monitoring, and security configuration standardization are some of the security solutions 
implemented, but “the number of incidents reported by federal agencies … has increased 
782 percent” in the same time.18 The number and sophistication of attacks continue to 
increase in lock step with demand for production of advanced threat detection solutions. 
It may be cost prohibitive to continue investments in advanced security solutions as 
attack complexity continues to increase. A distributed system that combines the strength 
of multiple current systems is needed as a cost-effective means to eliminate the 
weaknesses of any one system. The requirement is a “system of systems” (SoS) that 
aggregates network logs, alerts, statistics, and anomalies into a single system, which 
supports an overarching, multi-faceted, cybersecurity mission. The new capability should 
include a master system that draws from the subordinate systems and support the 
overarching mission and automation thereof. It should also include a master graphical 
user interface (GUI) that may include a lightweight, all source, common operating picture 
(COP). Multiple security systems may contribute to the strength of the whole by 
inherently adding layers to a defense-in-depth strategy without creating new, costly, or 
cumbersome security systems. 
Cyber-attacks can be extremely rapid and subtle at the same time. Cyber-attacks 
occurring at computer speeds render the human element of detection ineffective. 
Intelligent cyber-attacks designed to stay within the bounds of expected network traffic 
may yield system alerts that are not robust enough to use as detection triggers and thus, as 
                                                 
17 Executive Office of the President of the United States, Fiscal Year 2012 Report to Congress on the 
Implementation of The Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 (Washington, DC: White 
House, March 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/egov_docs/fy12_fisma.pdf; 
Department of Homeland Security, “Cyber Security Overview,” accessed April 29, 2014, 
https://www.dhs.gov/cybersecurity-overview; Tom Colburn, “Memo to Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, Senate Committee on Homeland Security & Governmental Affairs: FISMA Spending, 
Historical Trends,” Congressional Research Service, accessed July 29, 2014, 
http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public//index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=33d705f2-6629-4ee2-8be0-
50965da651b3. 
18 Government Accountability Office, “Cybersecurity,” accessed April 30, 2014, 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/652169.pdf. 
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singletons, are ineffective as a threat defeat mechanism. Organizations are generally ill-
prepared to deal with an evolving threat scenario because traditional security protection 
techniques once deemed effective can be subverted and threats can go undetected.19 As a 
result, “over 95% of companies [that happen to be compromised] are compromised with 
malware that is not detected by anti-virus or IPS signatures.”20 An integrated solution is 
required to defeat the cyber threat.21   
C. INTRUSION DETECTION AND PREVENTION SYSTEMS 
Central to cyber systems operations knowledge is an understanding of protection 
systems, their limitations, and the methods that threat actors use to circumvent them. 
Firewalls generally exist as in-line access control systems that allow packet traversal 
based on packet header information.22 Firewalls apply access control lists (ACL) that 
specify packet header values, which are allowed (i.e., whitelisted) or disallowed (i.e., 
blacklisted). Firewalls capable of deep packet inspection (DPI) allow access control at the 
application layer23 by interpreting packet payload similar to an intrusion detection system 
(IDS).  
IDSes can be grouped into three basic categories: network-based intrusion 
detection systems (NIDS), host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDS), and distributed 
intrusion detection systems (DIDS).24 Snort, OSSEC, and Arc Sight, are popular software 
                                                 
19 Lawrence Pingree and Neil MacDonald, “Best Practices for Mitigating Advanced Persistent 
Threats,” Gartner, January 18, 2012, http://www.trendmicro.de/media/wp/gartner-best-practices-for-
mitigating-apts-whitepaper-en.pdf. 
20 Naresh Venkat, “Rise in APT Attacks Calls for New Defenses Against Advanced Malware,” Dell 
Computer, March 8, 2013, http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/general-apt-attacks-new-defenses-
against-advanced-malware/. 
21 Ashar Aziz, “The Evolution of Cyber Attacks and Next Generation Threat Protection,” FireEye, 
presented at the RSA Conference 2013, San Francisco, CA, October 2013, 
https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/spo1-r31_spo1-r31.pdf. 
22 Wendell Odom, Cisco CCENT/CCNA ICND1 Official Exam Certification Guide, 2nd ed, 
(Indianapolis: Cisco Press, 2008), 155. 
23 An overview of the OSI and TCP/IP model layers can be found in James Michael Stewart, Ed Tittel, 
and Mike Chapple, Certified Information Systems Security Professional Study Guide, 4th ed., (Indianapolis: 
Wiley, 2008), 87. 
24 Toby Kohlenberg, Raven Alder, Everett F. Carter Jr. and James C. Foster, Snort IDS and IPS 
Toolkit (Burlington: Syngress Publishing, 2007), 5; Chris Sanders and Jason Smith, Applied Network 
Security Monitoring (Waltham, MA: Elsevier, 2014), 193. 
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examples of each category. IDS are either signature-based or anomaly-based and 
associate threats with known pattern matches or deviations from normal traffic.25 When 
an IDS detects a threat, an alert is generated in the form of a database record or an email 
to inform a network analyst of the threat. IDSs can be configured to allow only “known 
good” traffic and to create alerts for all other traffic; however, such systems are prone to 
false alarms. Thus, the alert on “known bad” approach is the model for most IDS.26 
Alerts can trigger active or passive responses (e.g., disrupting suspect traffic or 
generating a log entry). An IDS with active response can disrupt malicious activity by 
issuing TCP resets to the sender and/or receiver, or by updating a firewall block list.27 
FWSnort and SnortSAM are programs that provide active responses of TCP resets and 
firewall block lists, respectively.28 
Intrusion prevention systems (IPS) are a subcategory of IDS whereby packets 
must travel through an inline device. Snort_Inline is a program that provides IPS 
functionality to Snort.29 The drawbacks of an application like Snort IPS include 
complexity of configuration and the possibility of an IPS-induced network denial of 
service (DoS), e.g., Snort requires kernel recompilation to provide IPS functionality. 
Furthermore, the IPS can create a network bottleneck.30 
 “Logging is intrusion detection,”31 and at least the first line of alerting on 
network behavior. System and network log files provide the data that allow the human 
analyst to investigate alerts from an IDS. System logs are generated by system events, 
HIDS alerts, and a variety of host application software. Network logs come in two basic 
forms: full packet capture (FPC) and session data. FPC includes session data and all the 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 150. 
26 Toby Kohlenberg, Raven Alder, Everett F. Carter Jr. and James C. Foster, Snort IDS and IPS 
Toolkit (Burlington: Syngress Publishing, 2007), 9. 
27 Ibid., 26. 
28 Ibid., 570; Ibid., 576. 
29 Ibid., 604. 
30 Ibid., 606 
31 Marcus J. Ranum, “SCADA,” Firewall Wizards (mailing list), Seclists.org, April 16, 2009, 
http://seclists.org/firewall-wizards/2009/Apr/132. 
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contents of a packet. Session data is a communication summary that includes source 
addresses, destination addresses, protocols, and ports.32 FPC is desired because it is an 
exact copy of all the data that traversed the network, vice session data, which only reveals 
who was talking and in what language. There is an exclusive tradeoff between the two 
because the size of an FPC limits retention to hours or days instead of months or years as 
with session data.33  
In 2013, researchers found an average of 13 new vulnerabilities a day.34 
Constantly changing cyber threats demand a dynamic cyber defense that can pull from 
every available information source and fully investigate all details of an event. Chris 
Sanders, a noted cybersecurity expert, postulated that in 99% of investigations, analysts 
could find enough information to make determinations by referencing logs from within 
ten minutes before and after the time of an event.35 Sanders’s “Rule of 10” is a 
predefined window of time that can be used to prune the amount of information to a 
manageable size. Ideally, databases can maintain full, all source, sensor data within a 
small window of time, the investigation processes can be automated, and responses can 
be reduced to minutes. Ultimately, in cybersecurity, packet analysis and system 
monitoring is essential because “prevention eventually fails.”36Analysts must mine and 
examine log files in a labor intensive, non-standard manner using complex reasoning and 
situational information. Currently, there is no IDS that can replace the human analysts 
who determine if alerts are false positives or indications of true network threats.37 
                                                 
32 Chris Sanders and Jason Smith, Applied Network Security Monitoring (Waltham, MA: Elsevier, 
2014), 75-76. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Lev Grossman. “The Code War,” Time, July 21, 2014, 25. 
35 Chris Sanders and Jason Smith, Applied Network Security Monitoring (Waltham, MA: Elsevier, 
2014), 442. 
36 Chris Sanders and Jason Smith, Applied Network Security Monitoring (Waltham, MA: Elsevier, 
2014), 7. 
37 Toby Kohlenberg, Raven Alder, Everett F. Carter Jr. and James C. Foster, Snort IDS and IPS 
Toolkit (Burlington: Syngress Publishing, 2007), 18. 
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D. TAXONOMY OF CYBER EXPLOITATION TECHNIQUES 
“Cyber threats cover a wide range of malicious activity that can occur through 
cyberspace,” but it is the flaws in the target system, which enable a cyber-attack.38 
Threats generally have both the capability and the intent to exploit vulnerabilities in a 
target asset.39 Theoretically, there is no threat to an invulnerable target; however, 
invulnerable systems are impractical as security and usability are often mutually 
exclusive.40 There is a lucrative market for vulnerabilities, as evidenced by the $25M 
NSA allocation to remain current on emerging vulnerabilities.41 In the “vulnerability” 
industry, “Zero-days” are highly valued because they have not been previously 
encountered and consequentially, no mitigation exists for them.42 “Zero-Day” 
vulnerabilities, if unidentified may persist for years without detection.43  
There are many types of cyber exploitation techniques, but there are three that are 
generally employed as part of an advanced cyber-attack. Concealment, reconnaissance, 
and denial of service enable online anonymity, network enumeration, and protection 
circumvention.  
1. Concealment 
It is hard, if not impossible, to establish attribution in cyberspace when the 
attacker has taken steps to obfuscate his identity.44 Absence of attribution empowers a 
                                                 
38 Caitlin Hayden, spokeswoman for the White House National Security Council, quoted in The 
Verge, February 14, 2013, http://cambridgeriskframework.com/getdocument/21, p. 4; Martin C. Libicki, 
“Brandishing Cyberattack Capabilities,” RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2013. 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR175/RAND_RR175.pdf, vii. 
39 Chris Sanders and Jason Smith, Applied Network Security Monitoring (Waltham, MA: Elsevier, 
2014), 3. 
40 Winn Schwartau, Time Based Security (Seminole, FL: Interpact Press, 1999), 26. 
41 Lev Grossman, “The Code War,” Time, July 21, 2014, 18-25. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Michael Riley. “NSA Said to Exploit Heartbleed Bug for Intelligence for Years,” Businessweek, 
April 12, 2014, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-04-11/nsa-said-to-have-used-heartbleed-bug-
exposing-consumers. 
44 James A. Lewis, “Conflict and Negotiation in Cyberspace,” Center for Strategic & International 
Studies, February 2013, http://csis.org/files/publication/130208_Lewis_ConflictCyberspace_Web.pdf, 47. 
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hacker to launch attacks with impunity. Online identity concealment can be achieved by 
techniques such as onion routing, spoofing, and camouflage. 
Onion routing conceals the identity and location of an online user.45 It works by 
relaying connections across several encrypted tunnels over the Internet and ejecting the 
traffic with a source IP address common to many other users.46 International jurisdiction 
barriers can prevent law enforcement from gaining access to data that could establish a 
network identity. Regardless, international transmission cannot conclusively imply 
anonymous intent. Onion routing provides anonymity by design. The most common 
network that employs onion routing is Tor.47 It requires installation on a host computer as 
well as an intentional connection to the anonymity network.  
Spoofing occurs when a network identity masquerades as a different identity by 
modifying packet source addresses. Address resolution protocol (ARP) spoofing occurs 
when changes are made to the source media access control (MAC) address of a frame, 
and Internet protocol (IP) spoofing occurs when changes are made to the source IP 
address of a packet. “Engage Packet Builder” and “Scappy” are common programs 
employed for this purpose.48 Source address spoofing can be used to create packets with 
header information that specifically matches whitelist criteria or avoids blacklist filters. 
Spoofing is also an effective way to perform “man-in-the-middle” attacks and 
impersonate legitimate network users.49 
                                                 
45 Department of Homeland Security, “Secretary Johnson Highlights Results of Operation That 
Dismantled Underground Child Exploitation Enterprise on TOR Network,” March 18, 2014, 
http://www.dhs.gov/news/2014/03/18/secretary-johnson-highlights-results-operation-dismantled-
underground-child. 
46 TOR, “Tor: Overview,” accessed July 30, 2014, 
https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en. 
47 Paul Syverson, “A Peel of Onion,” Center for High Assurance Computer Systems, U.S. Naval 
Research Laboratory, accessed August 9, 2014, 
http://www.acsac.org/2011/program/keynotes/syverson.pdf. 
48 Chris Sanders, Practical Packet Analysis, (San Francisco: No Starch Press, 2007), 152; Tian Fu and 
Te-Shun Chou, “An Analysis of Packet Fragmentation Attacks vs. Snort Intrusion Detection System,” 
International Journal of Computer Engineering Science (IJCES) 2, no. 5 (May 2012): 66-68. 
49 A “man in the middle” attack is occurs when an attacker impersonates both sender and receiver and 
works as a proxy between them. 
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Attackers can bypass firewalls by camouflaging malicious traffic within 
legitimate communication channels. It is common practice to use a compromised HTTP 
server as a network pivot because traffic to the server can be hidden through a port 80 
that is necessarily allowed by perimeter router and firewall ACL. Commands to the 
server can be disguised as web traffic unless the firewall or IDS was specifically 
configured for deep packet inspection and protocol analysis. 
2. Reconnaissance 
Network intruders generally scan networks to determine what services are present 
in order to discover vulnerabilities associated with these services.50 Network systems 
provide services by design and weaknesses in those services present vulnerabilities. 
Vulnerability scanners such as “Nessus” are automated programs that can detect known 
vulnerabilities in services.51 They operate by sending special packets (viz., probes) over 
the network to invoke a response from a service. The responses allow an attacker to 
enumerate vulnerabilities. An attacker can manipulate vulnerabilities to invoke undesired 
functionality. The method of manipulation is known as an exploit.52 Metasploit is a 
software title that packages scan and exploit capabilities together as an effective tool for 
gaining access to vulnerable systems. Automated tools can quickly scan a server, 
enumerate vulnerabilities, and deploy pre-written buffer overflows to bypass 
authentication and security mechanisms. An attacker can easily upload, and in some cases 
“drag and drop,” readily available malware (viz., Zeus botnet) to fully compromise a 
server without any programming skills and limited experience. The tools are powerful, 
but also noisy. Scanning and enumeration activity can identify an attacker in the initial 
phases of attack and serve as an opportunity to begin defensive cyber operations to 
mitigate the attack. 
                                                 
50 Rafeeq U. Rehman, Intrusion Detection with Snort (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 
134. 
51 Ibid., 2. 
52 David Kennedy, Jim O'Gorman, Devon Kearns and Mati Aharoni, Metasploit: The penetration 
Tester's Guide (San Francisco: No Starch Press, 2011), 36. 
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3. Denial of Service 
DoS attacks generally occur as a result of an attacker “flooding” a network.53 A 
DoS attack is usually considered a cowardly attack tantamount to a nuisance, but 
sophisticated attacks can integrate an unsophisticated DoS attack as a way to circumvent 
network security.54 DoS attacks are not always intended to completely disrupt 
connectivity; instead an attacker may DoS a particular network component. DoS attacks 
can target server processes as well as network bandwidth. It is possible for a single 
computer to generate a formidable DoS attack by filling buffer queues or using other 
systems to amplify an attack.55 Some methods include half-open TCP connections (viz., 
SYN flood), incomplete fragmentation sessions (viz., “IP fragment incomplete 
datagram”), and induction of traffic from other computers (viz., Smurf attack or botnet 
distributed DoS). Analysts who disregard DoS attacks as insignificant may overlook the 
intent of the attack. MAC flooding can appear as an unsuccessful DoS attack, but will 
result in a switch “hubbing out” such that all traffic from any computer attached to the 
switch can be seen by the attacker.56 Likewise, an influx of false positives may not bring 
down a network, but will confuse an IDS enough that a true positive can be hidden in the 
noise and circumvent detection.57 EtherFlood and Stick are readily available tools that 
perform MAC flooding and IDS confusion, respectively.58  
IDS can be defeated by using DoS attacks. Snort uses a preprocessor named 
“Stream” that maintains a state table of packet fragments, which enables it to reconstruct 
                                                 
53 “Understanding Denial-of-Service Attacks,” United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team, 
November 4, 2009, modified February 06, 2013, https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-015. 
54 Richard A Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Cyber War (New York: Harper-Collins, 2010). 
55 Common DoS attacks are defined in the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration 
Center DDoS Quick Guide at  
https://www.us-cert.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DDoS%20Quick%20Guide.pdf , 2. 
56 Kimberly Graves, Certified Ethical Hacker Study Guide (Indianapolis: Wiley, Inc., 2010), 164. 
57 Chris Sanders and Jason Smith, Applied Network Security Monitoring (Waltham, MA: Elsevier, 
2014), 249. 
58 Etherflood is detailed at http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-
050314-4438-99; Stick is explained in Toby Kohlenberg, Raven Alder, Everett F. Carter Jr. and James C. 
Foster, Snort IDS and IPS Toolkit (Burlington: Syngress Publishing, 2007), 249. 
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payload and search for a malicious signature.59 “IP fragment incomplete datagram” can 
use the Snort Stream preprocessor to DoS the IDS by overwhelming the memory 
resources of the underlying IDS hardware.60 
Bandwidth DoS attacks are extremely effective against IDS because of the nature 
of port spanning. A SPAN (Switched Port Analyzer) port relays all traffic on a set of 
ports to another port or set of ports.61 Each port in a switched gigabit Ethernet 
environment is capable of two gigabits per second (Gbps) of total throughput (one Gbps 
in each direction).62 A sensor would require two gigabit ports to fully monitor each full 
duplex port during a DoS attack or else it would be impossible to capture all the traffic.63 
In addition to network bandwidth considerations, there are also limitations to hard drive 
transfer rates and bus bandwidth. Each Gbps of network throughput requires 125 
megabytes per second (MBps) hard drive throughput to archive sensor data. With the 
current technology, both hard disk drives and solid state drives can be overwhelmed by a 
relatively small number of span ports.64 Any time network data rates exceed the transfer 
and write throughput of a sensor, data will be discarded. Furthermore, an overwhelming 
volume of data could cause an archive to be overwritten when available space is 
exceeded. In each case, DoS attacks can thwart collection of evidence of an advanced 
attack. 
A DoS attack against the analyst can be most effective and easiest to perform 
because there is no need for bandwidth or system resource exhaustion. An attacker would 
need to only ensure that an IDS generate enough false positive alerts, that a human 
                                                 
59 Toby Kohlenberg, Raven Alder, Everett F. Carter Jr. and James C. Foster, Snort IDS and IPS 
Toolkit (Burlington: Syngress Publishing, 2007), 238. 
60 Tian Fu and Te-Shun Chou. “An Analysis of Packet Fragmentation Attacks vs. Snort Intrusion 
Detection System.” International Journal of Computer Engineering Science (IJCES) 2, no. 5 (May 2012): 
66-68. 
61 Toby Kohlenberg, Raven Alder, Everett F. Carter Jr. and James C. Foster, Snort IDS and IPS 
Toolkit (Burlington: Syngress Publishing, 2007), 136. 
62 Chris Sanders and Jason Smith, Applied Network Security Monitoring (Waltham, MA: Elsevier, 
2014), 55. 
63 Ibid., 623. 
64 Hard Disk Drives (HDD) generally demonstrate transfer rates of 250 Mbps and Solid State Drives 
(SSD) generally demonstrate transfer rates of 550 Mbps at the time of this writing. 
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analyst would dismiss a true positive as a false positive. Some implementations of the 
attack exist that create false positives for nearly every rule in a Snort rule set.65 There are 
five basic attacks against an IDS that can mislead an analyst and circumvent statistical 
anomaly detection systems. The attacks include noise masked attacks (overwhelming 
number of alerts), attack misdirection (spoofed source addresses), evidence reputability 
attacks (strategically implanted false positives), target conditioning attacks (create false 
positives until the attack looks like normal traffic), and statistical poisoning attacks 
(slowly increase the benchmarks of statistical anomaly IDS with near threshold 
attacks).66 Easily accessible programs such as Sock_Raw, Nemesis, and Libnet are well 
known tools commonly used to generate false positives and manipulate statistical 
benchmarks.67 
E. NETWORK SECURITY MONITORING 
Investigations generally have a process e.g., in criminal investigations, a detective 
will work to establish means, motive, and opportunity. An analogy to this in the cyber 
domain is the network security monitoring (NSM) cycle. NSM is a framework that 
contains three phases: collection, detection, and analysis.68  
1. Collection 
Collection from as many relevant data sources as feasible is necessary to create a 
common cyber picture. Network correlation programs implement security information 
and event management (SIEM) to aggregate syslogs, network sensor events, host-based 
sensor events and alerts from multiple disparate programs such as Alienvault Open 
Source Security Information Manager (OSSIM). There are also popular proprietary 
systems such as McAfee e-Policy Orchestrator (ePO) and Symantec Endpoint Protection 
                                                 
65 Samuel Patton, William Yurick and David Doss, “An Achilles' Heel in Signature-Based IDS: 
Squealing False Positives in SNORT,” Illinois State University, accessed August 2, 2014, 
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Management (SEPM) that combine the features of antivirus, firewall, and host based 
IDS. Currently there is no one software product that aggregates all information sources 
and integrates all network assets and it is not practical to log everything at all times. The 
Applied Collection Framework (ACF) is a four-step methodology for reducing 
information collection to a manageable set of components.69 ACF requires a master 
analyst to define threats, quantify risk, identify data feeds, and narrow focus. 
Threats can be identified by surmising the worst case scenario for a particular 
network asset. Systems sometimes require different levels of confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability and as such, threats to one system may be orthogonal to threats to another 
system. Threats should be refined relative to the asset (viz., a disgruntled employee who 
may steal information or a database compromise via an Internet facing web server).  
Risk can be quantified by calculating the product of probability and impact.70 A 
likely event with a small impact can represent more risk than an unlikely event with a big 
impact. Impact is relative to the asset. Assets are the hardware and software components 
of network architecture. Risk is relative because “all assets are not created equal, and do 
not deserve equal protection.”71 
Data feeds are pertinent to each asset. Data pathways must be identified in order 
to determine the impact of a breach. Data feeds are generally network based and host 
based. Network based data feeds include full packet captures, session data, throughput 
statistical data, signature based network IDS alert data, anomaly based IDS alert data, and 
firewall log data.72 Host based data feeds include operating system log data, antivirus 
alert data, and host based IDS alert data.73 
Focus is necessary to distinguish valued data feeds from data feeds of relatively 
little value. If there were unlimited storage and management available, there would be 
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little need to narrow the focus. As the quantity of data increases so does the burden on 
systems and people to process data. Data duplication can occur from redundant systems 
and ultimately produce more overhead than value. It is important to perform a cost 
benefit analysis to determine the data feeds that yield the greatest value. 
2. Detection 
Detection is defined as “the process by which collected data is examined and 
alerts are generated based upon observed events and data that are unexpected.”74 
Detection is generally an automated process performed by host based and network based 
intrusion detection systems. Correlation programs generally correlate system logs and 
alert data from host and network sensors, and then organize this data in ways a human 
analyst can interpret al.ert data can be preconfigured by priority and severity. High 
priority alerts can be pushed to the top of an analyst’s list and alerts of greater severity 
can be escalated to analysts of a higher skill level. Priority and severity are predefined for 
each risk. Computer programs create alerts when a signature pattern match occurs or a 
statistical anomaly threshold is broken. Common programs that organize detection data 
for the Snort IDS include Snorby, Snort graphical user interface for lamers (SGUIL), and 
the analysis console for intrusion databases (ACID). Generally automated active response 
is not implemented because of the risk of “false positive DoS”75 and an analyst must 
determine appropriate response.76 
The human analyst provides the cognition to detect suspicious characteristics of 
network information. There are ten basic properties of suspicious network events:77 
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Security relevance is determined if a security violation is remotely possible. 
Access to protected areas is suspicious; access to uncritical publicly available files is not. 
Time is better spent scrutinizing assets of high security value over the lesser. 
Contextual mismatch is an obvious red flag. Computer filenames generally have 
consistent form so a file name with several spaces in succession should be suspect, even 
though it does not violate rules of file names. 
Potential malicious explanation is the sense that something appears to be 
malicious even though the analyst cannot prove it is malicious. An encrypted 
communication channel may be for legitimate privacy concerns, but remains suspect until 
the analyst knows for sure. 
Possible stealth or bypass attempts can be found in logs as audit failures. 
Repeated attempts to gain access, even if unsuccessful, should immediately warrant 
suspicion. An event log success audit from the same attempter is also suspicious. 
Encrypted communication initiated from a server to public address space outside of the 
organizational boundary should be suspect until proven valid. 
Implausible non-independence is best described by Ian Fleming “once is 
happenstance, twice is coincidence, the third time is enemy action”78 
Guilt by association occurs when otherwise unsuspicious events are suspect 
because they are in proximity to known malicious events. 
Guilt by causation occurs when otherwise unsuspicious events are caused by 
known malicious events. 
Minimal compromise hypothesis is derived when otherwise unsuspicious events 
could have caused known malicious events. 
Boundary integrity - changes in security principals are suspicious. 
Novelty - anomalies are suspicious. 
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Suspicious activity narrows the scope for analysis so a human or machine can focus on 
the more likely malicious behavior. The ten basic properties of suspicious network events 
are reasonable to base a methodology for cyber profiling. 
3. Analysis 
Analysis processes require input, investigation, and decision by subject matter 
experts. Collection data and alerts serve as effective inputs. There are two basic ways to 
investigate alerts: relational investigation and differential diagnosis.79 Relational 
investigations are typical of law enforcement. Suspects and their relationships to the 
victims are explored to find a plausible connection. Differential diagnosis is typical of the 
medical community. A patient complains of symptoms and the doctor eliminates 
possibilities until only the culprit remains. Both methods can be reduced to a trainable 
sequence of steps.80 These methods of investigation have strengths and weaknesses 
depending on the circumstance and who is investigating. It is advantageous in both 
circumstances to have data from as many sources as possible in order to explore all the 
possibilities to explain an event.  
Differential diagnosis of network events can be reduced to five simple steps.81 
Identification of anomalous traffic or alert data is the trigger to start the diagnosis. The 
second step is to rule out the most common and easiest to characterize possibilities. The 
third step is to identify the remaining, more hard to diagnose possibilities then, as a fourth 
step prioritize them by severity. Lastly, each possibility should be ruled out using all 
available sources of data. This type of analysis is ideally suited for an FPC because a 
sufficient data set exists where by possibilities can be methodically ruled out. 
Relational investigation can be reduced to four simple steps.82 Step one is to 
investigate the primary subject of the alert or anomaly. Step two includes all interactions 
with the primary subject. This information broadens the scope to include traffic initiated 
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to the primary subject and traffic initiated from the primary subject. Step three is an 
investigation of the secondary subjects that communicated with the primary and 
transmissions to and from the secondary subjects. Step four includes the continuation of 
the process for as long as there are connections and correlations that can be attributed to 
an event such as protocols and time. Correlations can show the impact and reach of a 
cyber-attack. Session data is good for this type of analysis. 
F. INTRUSION KILL CHAIN 
There are two basic types of network defense: vulnerability-centric and threat-
centric. Vulnerability-centric defense is much like fortress mentality and has proven 
ineffective. The finest computer security system on the market will eventually fail, no 
safe is impenetrable, nor is any security system.83 A threat-centric defense presumes that 
prevention systems will fail.84 To create a stronger threat-centric defense, network-
available data must be aggregated and related along with details of an attack into subject 
matter expert-validated actionable information that initiates automated response 
processes commensurate with the attack and in accordance organizational policy.  
Network defenders determined that hacker attacks follow a predictable pattern or 
“kill chain.”85 A kill chain is a series of activities that an attacker must traverse in order 
to accomplish his objective and if the sequence is disrupted at any point, the attacker will 
fail to accomplish his objective.86 The intrusion kill chain has seven phases: 
reconnaissance, weaponization, delivery, exploitation, installation, Command and 
Control (C2), and actions on objectives.87 Attackers generally reuse tools and methods to 
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save time and effort.88 Known malicious activities in an early stage of an attack can be 
used to identify unknown exploits using guilt by causation and guilt by association. 
Furthermore, minimal compromise hypothesis can be used to identify actionable 
intelligence from events leading up to a compromise. Patterns identified within a ten 
minute window before and after each event can be used as actionable intelligence for 
active responses. A dynamic defense provides the vigorous response that “is the key to 
managing cyber espionage.”89 
The intrusion kill chain has six courses of action that are about stopping an attack 
(viz., Detect, Deny, Disrupt, Degrade, Deceive, Destroy).90 Network protection must use 
these courses of action to sufficiently lengthen an intrusion kill chain traversal time such 
that the sums of detection and response times are always less than the time it takes for an 
attacker to traverse the entire kill chain.91 If the time of detection and response are ever 
greater than the amount of time an attacker takes to traverse the entire kill chain, the 
result is a breach. Cyber defense automation is necessary to reduce detection and 
response times below the intrusion kill chain traversal time. This is because hackers 
generally use automated tools in each phase of the hacker methodology. The functions of 
an analyst could be rapidly modeled to account for changes in the cyber threatscape. New 
threat signatures can be continuously extrapolated from data captured from attacks by 
integrating as many cyber defense technologies as possible. As a result, cyber defense 
will become dynamic.  
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G. INTEROPERABILITY 
Geometric increases of network traffic volume92 undermine IDS and collection 
technologies. “The previous mindset where all data sources that are available were 
collected and thrown into a central repository has resulted in deployments that are 
incredibly cost ineffective to manage … and they don’t scale to the amount of data they 
are forced to contend with.”93 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that “putting any 
amount of effort into a stovepipe solution [to mitigate the cyber threat] is too costly in 
time and money and does not keep pace with network threats.”94 The failure of the 
traditional analysis model is evidence that it may be necessary to decentralize the model 
and shift to a threat centric, distributed, collection oriented model. Distributed 
aggregation models between disparate systems have no shortage of challenges. Recent 
attempts to produce the information systems interconnection “Holy Grail” generally yield 
little more than a “Poison Chalice” of cost overruns, lost revenue, and delayed programs. 
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) system disasters of Hershey’s and HP are well 
documented and have become case studies of the dangers of costly systems 
integrations.95 The Federal government has a long history of cost overruns due to failed 
integration projects. The U.S. Air Force’s Expeditionary Combat Support System (ECSS) 
is a recent example of a failed attempt at an integrated system where the Federal 
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government paid over $1B and no capability was delivered.96 Moreover, an additional 
$1B was required simply to deliver a quarter of the expected capability.97 Even though 
the system was scrapped, the Air Force has appropriated over $2B into yet another 
integration system to replace legacy systems.98 Unfortunately, the new system is 
demonstrating many of the same problems reminiscent of the first.99 According to the 
Government Accountability Office, the U.S. Navy recently wasted $1B on consolidated 
ERP systems.100 These three examples demonstrate the cost of failure in making systems 
integration work; in particular, where money was spent and there was no return. The 
Affordable Healthcare Act mandate was somewhat of a success story where 
determination and steadfast spending can eventually result in a working integration 
technology. The cost of success: $4.8B—and counting.101 Systems integration is a multi-
billion dollar problem and current practices are not working. VRDM is specifically 
designed to solve this problem and initial prototypes and examples indicate that it has the 
potential to result in cost savings as well as better systems integration.102The common 
driver is a need to create value by combining multiple systems and processes into a 
single, more capable system. Generally, a system that consists of “large-scale concurrent 
and distributed systems” and associated complex components combine to create a 
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“system of systems.”103 There are four basic interoperability modes that are known to 
establish an SoS, they include: re-engineering, ad-hoc, standards based (star), and data 
warehouse interoperability.104  
Re-engineering (Figure 1) is typical of large scale efforts to code all systems into 
a single integrated system that interconnects by design.105 However, “coding is 
unreliable, error prone, and brittle” where a single flaw can result in systemic effects.106 
Similar integration models have proven very costly in time and resources, exceedingly 
difficult to manage, and resistant to rapid reconfiguration.107 The setup time of re-
engineering is the greatest of all interoperability modes because of the ground up 
approach used to create interconnectivity. Re-engineering creates a static solution to a 
problem but does not natively scale to include incorporation of additional systems for 
future integration.  
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 Reengineering interoperability model. Code for multiple Figure 1. 
systems is rewritten into a single composite integrated suite. 
Lack of scalability, time and cost overruns, and systemic error 
susceptibility are common consequences of this model. 
Ad-hoc integration (Figure 2) is implemented by reprogramming the code of each 
system in order for it to communicate with other systems.108 If a system is added, not 
only shall the system be reprogrammed to communicate with each system on the 
network, but each system on the network must be reprogrammed to communicate with 
each additional system. New security products come to the market frequently and each 
new product requires implementation of a new adapter.109 Ad-hoc integration 
demonstrates a phenomenon of accelerating growth of complexity per Metcalfe’s Law 
where each increase to ‘n’ systems will increase system complexity at the rate of n(n-
1)/2.110 Ad-hoc integration is a quick and effective solution to aggregate a small number 
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of systems with similar design but lacks the capability to effectively scale to the 
requirements of a growing enterprise cybersecurity system. 
 
 Ad-hoc interoperability model. Code is written into each Figure 2. 
system to communicate with every other system. Cost and 
time scalability increases ~n
2
 for each n systems.   
Standards-based (Star) Interoperability (Figure 3) is comparable to a hub and 
spoke method of interoperability. It operates on the premise that all nodes can 
communicate with a central node, which is capable of “translating” between each node. 
This model is generally specific to the domain of interest and does not scale well if 
disparate systems are introduced. Furthermore, a change in semantics at the hub would 
likely require reprogramming of all translators to accommodate the change.111 
Application layer standards-based interoperability generally requires middleware (for 
each type of system) in the core of the architecture. It is “an approach that has proven to 
be code-intensive, brittle, and subject to a geometric complexity curve.”112 
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 Standards-based interoperability model. Middleware is Figure 3. 
programmed in the core for each communicating system type. 
Similar to ad-hoc integration but middleware translators exist 
at the hub. 
Data Warehouse Integration (Figure 4) is also a hub and spoke topology, but 
consists of a common data repository where all sources are linked. SIEM systems 
generally use this integration topology to aggregate logs and sensor data to a central data 
repository. This method pushes data from the network edge to the network core and 
results in large overhead of network bandwidth, data storage, and processing at the core 
of the architecture. Disparate systems may employ disparate databases and proprietary 
data repositories that cannot natively integrate into a data warehouse interoperability 
model. This model also requires code-intensive middleware on each node to support 
integration of disparate systems.113 
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 Data warehouse interoperability model. Backend databases are Figure 4. 
standardized with middleware at each node and aggregated 
into one resource intensive database architecture in the core. 
This model requires code intensive middleware on each node 
to support integration of disparate systems. 
GINA is a relatively new interoperability model framework that is the “only 
known manageable approach to implementing large-scale interoperability (Figure 5).”114 
VRDM is the answer to the n
2
 scalability problem common to afore mentioned 
integration models because it “is scalable, extendable, and expandable with minimal 
effort.”115 GINA is an implementation of VRDM (GINA is a GINA model) and is an 
interoperability architecture that “can draw from any information source available on the 
                                                 
114  Thomas Anderson, Dan Dolk and Frank Busalacchi, “Network Certification of GINA and 
Development of CONOPs for the GINA Tunnel System” (unpublished manuscript, October 2012). 
115 Daniel Dolk, Thomas Anderson, Frank Busalacchi and David Tinsley. “GINA: System 
Interoperability for Enabling Smart Mobile System Services in Network Decision Support Systems,” IEEE 
(2011), accessed July 21, 2014, doi: 10.1109/HICSS.2012.293, 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=6149063&isnumber=6148595. 
 29 
network” without a need to reprogram any of the existing systems.116 In many cases, 
cyber systems have back end databases that can be accessed directly as an object within 
the VRDM configuration and manipulated at the source without any need for data 
warehousing or translation. The framework can theoretically aggregate information from 
any type and number of sources into a common environment with a customizable view 
(Figure 5).117 The implication is, the system allows for very specific, compartmentalized 
information that can serve as an all source interpreter capable of linear node complexity 
per each new “n” of growth.  
Achieving a linear growth in complexity as systems grow and evolve is in stark 
contrast to the geometric growth in complexity (rate of ~n
2
). The benefit is realized by 
system development using a state of the art service oriented architecture (SOA) approach 
(Figure 6). For large-scale systems integration, linear growth in the complexity of the 
integration problem limits propensity for error, saves time and thus increases the 
likelihood of success. The reduced cost in time has been documented; a “fully 
interoperable, integrated operational capability of multiple sensor systems” was 
configured in a VRDM in less than 16 labor hours.118 It is necessary to put this in 
context; it generally takes a programming expert two to four days to program a single 
output plugin to a common program.119  
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 VRDM interoperability model. System APIs and backend Figure 5. 
databases can be directly accessed and virtually aggregated. 
Data configurations can be accessed in a web based interface 
or emulated as directly connected data sources common to all 
nodes on the network. 
 
Excess network bandwidth consumption, high maintenance costs and overhead 
characteristics of standards-based and data-warehouse integration models are eliminated in 
the VRDM interoperability model, as are problems of scale in reengineering and ad-hoc 
models. The concept of “Valued Information at the Right Time” (VIRT) allows 
subcomponent systems to pull only the subset of data required for a certain task.120 VIRT 
makes centralized warehousing of sensor information obsolete because data density can be 
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increased and stored locally at the edge of the network. An analytical engine anywhere on 
the network can make scoped requests to the necessary columns from specified rows of a 
dataset across the network on demand. The VRDM interoperability model efficiently uses 
network resources and distributes parallel computing power to the network edge by design.  
 
 Complexity per number of systems for traditional service Figure 6. 
oriented architecture (SOA) approach (blue diamond) and 
VRDM approach (red square). Complexity correlates with 
both time and cost associated with expanding a system. The 
GINA framework allows for a linear growth in complexity as 
the systems grows and changes. As a SOA becomes more 
complex, a VRDM configuration is transparent and 
reconfigurable. Note that the lin-log scale is required to allow 
the geometric data to plot in view. 
H. VECTOR RELATIONAL DATA MODELING (VRDM) 
VRDM introduces a pseudo-cognitive approach to cyber threat protection 
management (CTPM). Human cognition is comprised of attention, working memory, 
processing speed, long-term memory, visual processing, auditory processing, logic and 

























between them number in the hundreds of trillions.121 The disparities are evident by orders 
of magnitude and suggest that the brain derives greater power from the synapse. 
Similarly, in the Cyber Domain, a great value can be realized in forming synapses or 
relationships between data sources. Relationships between data sources are rapidly 
configured in VRDM as data objects and may be reused without the need to recode each 
relationship individually. GINA is the modeling environment for VRDM to efficiently 
create relationships between any number of cybersecurity information sources. This 
section is an introduction to the core components of VRDM and explains how 
information modeling can be used to rapidly develop and deploy new and diverse 
decision configurations for cyber threat response (CTR) without recompiling software. 
VRDM allows the configured specification of an SoS, including the behavior or 
process. This entails aggregation of network-available data and specifying the behavior of 
the system and system components in an information configuration. The configuration 
components and the relationships between the components are stored as objects. The 
information configuration’s ability to execute process implies that notional concept of 
operations (CONOPs) may be configured and executed as semi-sentient behavior. 
CONOPs were developed and implemented as a functional proof-of-concept of the 
application of the new technology on a working Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 
server using actual tunnel sensor data, knowledge database and system behavior that 
orchestrates management of information associated with tunnel investigations from 
cradle to grave of a tunnel event.122 In the Cyber Domain, VRDM was recently used to 
create a geospatial visual analytic near real-time capability.123 These proof of concept 
VRDM configurations illustrate the extensible SoS and mission process capabilities that 
were a primary motivation for this effort. 
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1. Concept 
In contrast to relational databases that consist of a source and visual layer, VRDM 
organizes data in three distinct layers: visual, semantic, and source (Figure 7). The visual 
layer of a relational database is a representation of source records displayed in a form or 
result of a query. The semantic layer is an intermediate layer with the capability to 
objectively define source data. The source layer of a relational database is the data that 
exist in rows and columns of database tables.  
Generally, relationships between relational databases are implicitly defined as key 
columns. Relationships can be defined in VRDM as a manageable object that can be 
applied to another object. Relational databases generally require complex SQL scripting 
to manipulate and perform meaningful operations on data. In VRDM, performing 
complex operations is a matter of configuration rather than scripting, such that an 
operation can be defined as an object and in turn applied to data. When operations, 
sources, and relationships are defined as objects, they can be reapplied without the need 
to reapply the work of defining the object. There are nine key concepts for the three 
framework layers in VRDM124:  
                                                 
124 Intelligence Support Organization, Dragon Pulse Information Management System GINA Manual, 
Ft. Leavenworth, KS: TRADOC, 2013, 1. 
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1. Connections  
2. Sources  
3. Columns 
4. X-types  
5. Elements  
6. Vectors  
7. Vector References  
8. Forms  
9. Windows 
All of the VRDM constituent objects and the configuration itself are configured in the 
framework’s web browser-based user interface (UI). This UI is a simple, forms based 





 X-types organize elements into relationships created by Vectors. Each red box represents a Vector that Figure 7. 
relates Elements (blue boxes). Each Element is mapped to a column in a table. The relationship between 
Elements is visualized in a form. 
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2. Source 
The information configuration’s source layer can be configured to map to a 
specific column of a table in a relational database or to an explicitly defined value. This 
allows for focused, compartmentalized access and uses of exact information from the 
broader table and database. Data sources are defined in the information configuration as 
several objects that combine to contain the address of a database, the name of a table in 
that database, and credentials for access. The process of data source definition is 
documented in Appendix E-6. An Access Code is an object that defines username and 
password for authentication. The browser based UI for Access Code allows configuration 
of the semantic identification of an Access Code with the corresponding username and 
password (see Figure 8). The ‘Access Code’ object is used as a component object in the 
information configuration. 
 
 Access Code configuration is converted into an object by Figure 8. 
giving the authentication pair a name which can be applied to 
database connections.  
A Connection is an object that defines the name, network location, and type of a 
data source (viz., anything where data of interest exists.) If the source is a database, the 
connection would be the database name, IP address, and type (viz., MySQL, Oracle, 
MSSQL). The configuration of the Connection object allows port specification for non-
standard ports, and a retry count specification for persistence (Figure 9). User names and 
passwords are stored within a table that inherits MSSQL Server security. 
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 The Connection supplies the network location of a data Figure 9. 
source, the authentication format of the data source, and 
specifies an Access Code (Figure 8). The combined properties 
form a Connection object which is given a name. 
A Connection Type (Figure 10) specifies a connection string format for 
information forwarded to external middleware or open database connections (ODBC). 
Authentication and security information is designated as the Access Code in each 
Connection for a particular data source.  
 
 Connection type is the format of authentication strings that are Figure 10. 
used for remote data sources. Here, the string is passed to a 
MySQL ODBC connector. The Connection type object is used 
to format data Access Code (Figure 8) and Connection (Figure 
9) objects for each data source type. 
A Source maps to a table (or view) within a database and the content server used 
to communicate to the data source (Figure 11). A content server (specified in the Source) 
is an object that understands the language or syntax of a particular data source. Content 
servers can use an ODBC driver for open database connections and can be programmed 
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to parse specific Extensible Markup Language (XML) data.129 The content server is the 
code component in a VRDM that requires programming in order to accommodate new, 
non-standard protocols and services. Configuration is a point and click operation for 
standard databases and services. 
 
 Source configuration in UI. The Content Server, in this case Figure 11. 
“SQLContentServer,” is already constructed as an object 
entity, is specified by a drop down tab.  
A Source Column is an object defined in a Source that specifies the exact location 
of data within a data source (Figure 12). A Column is generally specified as a table 
column in a database, but can also be assigned a value, and derive a value from other 
                                                 
129 An example of GINA custom content manager code is in Appendix B of Naval Postgraduate 
School Capstone Report, Team Bravo “Viable Short-Term Directed Energy Weapon Naval Solutions: A 
Systems Analysis of Current Prototypes,” master’s capstone, Naval Postgraduate School, June 2013.  
 39 
objects such as a parser for a command output. Every column in a table can be identified 
as a VRDM data source object. 
 
 Columns in a remote database table are also Columns in a Figure 12. 
VRDM Source. The Source Column must be the same name 
of the database table column. The red arrow points to an 
example of a multipart column. 
The Access Code, Connection, Source, Content Server, and Column objects 
together define a path to a remote data source and define credentials for access (Figure 
13). This granularity of objects allows for reuse; for instance, there may be multiple 
copies of network sensor software that all have the same password, table name, column 
names, and differ only by database name and location. In that case, an administrator need 
only create a new Connection object for each server and reuse the Access Code, Source, 
Content server, and Column objects for each data source. Simplicity of interconnection in 
the form of object configuration reduces the complexity of interconnection to a series of 




 Data sources are accessed through a series of objects (Access Figure 13. 
Code, Connection, Source, and Column) that together define 
the path and credentials to access information in the data 
source. 
Object granularity supports the principal of VIRT by requesting only desired 
information as a result of a query executed on the remote data source. The information 
configuration can use VIRT to aggregate databases when relationships can be defined 
between the source columns. Using VRDM, databases are not aggregated by copying all 
data source columns to a central repository, instead, the databases are aggregated 
virtually, by specifying the precise information source. Data processing overhead remains 
on the remote data source. 
3. Semantic 
The semantic layer is where meaning is defined as a method of identification, 
regardless of the originating source of the data. The same type of information may exist 
in multiple databases under different names. Take for example a column that contains 
source IP addresses. This column could be named ip_src (viz., Snort database plugin) or 
RemoteIP (viz., Apache log directive). The information configuration defines both 
columns as an object with the name SourceIPAddress. In effect, data from disparate 
sources can be normalized in the semantic layer as objects that contain the same type of 
data. Normalizing is necessary to allow interactions with other objects without the need 
to create a specific instance for each relationship. The semantic layer is comprised of 
three core objects: X-types, Elements, and Vectors.  
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The X-type object is an abstracted concept analogous to a database table and 
forms the foundation of the semantic layer (Figure 14). X-types have Elements that map, 
via Sources, to specific columns in specific tables in underlying databases. They organize 
objects in a conceptual framework that can operate independent of interoperability 
implications. X-types can contain native Element objects from only one source. Source 
columns have an inherent relationship to other source columns within the same source 
table. Likewise, an X-type Persistent Element has an implied relationship between all 
other Persistent Elements in the same X-type. Relational databases form relationships 
between tables with primary and foreign keys. An X-type however, uses Vectors to relate 
Elements between X-types. The implication is that X-types relate columns much in the 
same manner that relational databases relate tables. X-types organize Elements similar to 
how relational database organize columns within a table. They logically aggregate 
columns from multiple tables into a single related X-type. X-type objects include 
Elements, Vectors, and Services. 
 
 X-types are objects where relationships, information, and Figure 14. 
actions are all defined. An X-type is like a table of Elements 
and references to other Elements. 
Elements are the semantic representation of a source column and may be assigned 
mathematical functions to act on the data in columns (Figure 15). Semantic normalization 
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in the configuration occurs at the Element, where the naming convention implemented 
must be unambiguous. The abstract nature of an Element distinguishes it from the 
physical nature of a source column such that Elements can become windows to the data 
in other Elements. Where a source column may vary by name and type, semantic data is 
normalized into Elements. Elements can redefine a source column as a function of the 
data in a source column much like a SQL view can change the format of a column or 
perform mathematical operations on data within a relational database column. A series of 
Elements combined as an object can produce a complex mathematical algorithm and be 
applied to other Elements. This is similar to an Excel formula that can be applied to cells 
in a spreadsheet (Figure 16). There are three main types of Elements: Persistent 
Elements, Vector Elements, and Reference Elements. They are described here because 
they are used extensively in the CTRC. 
 
 The properties of elements are configured in a single screen. Figure 15. 
They can be mapped to a persistent column, reference other 
elements, or be a mathematical function of two elements.  
Persistent Elements may be mapped directly to source columns or assigned 
explicit values. Generally, a Persistent Element maps to a column in a relational database. 
Values in a Persistent Element do not map to, or derive their meaning from other 
Elements. They can also be assigned explicitly defined values. 
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 An X-type’s Element can be a mathematical function Figure 16. 
comprised of other Elements. Here, Element C is specified as 
Element A plus Element B for each row in the X-type. This is 
analogous to a formula in Excel. 
Reference Elements are Elements that relay data between X-types by using 
Vectors to form relationships between those X-types (Vectors are explained in the next 
paragraph). A Reference Element is analogous to an Excel reference cell, except that 
changes to a reference element are reflected in the source X-type. X-types of disparate 
sources must have at least one relationship between them for the information in each 
Element to correlate across X-types. In essence, a one to one relationship between one or 
more reference Elements will result in a single row of related data as if the data was in 
the same X-type. Figure 17 is an illustration of the concept. There are two X-types shown 
in this example, X-type Apache and X-type Snort. X-type Apache contains url and 
SourceIP Elements. X-type Snort contains sourceIP, destinationIP, destinationport, and 
timestamp Elements. The relationship between the two X-types is sourceIP. The 
SourceIP Element is a Vector Reference in this example. Once a relationship is 
configured from X-type Snort to X-type Apache, Elements from X-type Snort can be 
referenced in X-type Apache. In effect, X-type Apache contains the elements in X-type 
Snort. Reference Elements can be manipulated from any host X-type and the changes will 
propagate to every X-type where the Element is referenced. Figure 17 shows that a 
change to the timestamp reference element in the form will replicate to the source 
element in the Snort X-type. 
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 Apache and Snort X-types are at the top, an X-type with Figure 17. 
Reference Elements is in the middle and a form that displays 
the X-type with Reference Elements is at the bottom. Here, the 
timestamp Reference Element is analogous to a window from 
the Snort X-type to the Apache X-type where Elements can be 
manipulated as if they were in the Apache X-type. 
Vector Elements read in values from Persistent Elements and Reference Elements 
by filtering values relative to a Vector Reference Element in the context of a particular X-
type. Vector Elements are assigned Vectors that contain References. A Vector Element 
can be thought of as a column of reference cells in Excel where data from a different 
worksheet can be referenced and used as if it physically existed in the worksheet. 
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Vectors form the basis of relationships between Elements (Figure 18). Vectors are 
objects that can be applied to multiple Elements. There are four basic types of Vector 
relationships: V-Collection, V-Union, V-Derivation, and V-Declaration.130 
A V-Collection defines a one-to-many relationship between Elements of different 
X-types. It associates values in one Element to corresponding values in another Element. 
In the case of this CTRC, a V-Collection relates a record in an Apache web log to all the 
records in a packet capture that correspond to the Apache log event. For instance, if a 
person visits a website, there is one row created in the web log database that represents 
the single http request. However, there may be hundreds of rows in the Snort packet 
capture database that correspond to the one weblog row. Since the two are in different 
databases and different tables, a V-Collection forms the relationship. 
A V-Derivation is a relationship between two Elements that have relationships 
with a common Element. For example, if A is related to B and C is related to B, then A is 
related to C through B. 
A V-Declaration is a relationship that is assigned or declared between two 
unrelated Elements. A special table is used to define relationships between Elements. An 
analogy for this is: the adoption of a child results in the creation of a certificate of 
adoption that declares the relationship between the adopted parents and the child even 
though the adopted parents are not the biological parents. In this case, a V-Collection 
returns the biological parents and a V-Declaration returns the adopted parents. 
A V-Union is similar to a SQL outer join where two Vectors are combined to 
create a relationship between two Elements by relating the Vectors. If A is related to B 
and C is related to D, a relationship between A+B and C+D will relate A and B to C and 
D. In the case of the adopted child as an Element, a V-Union of both the V-Declaration 
and the V-Collection Vectors return both sets of parents with a single Vector object. 
Here, it is important to note that relating SQL objects generally requires the user to have 
                                                 
130 Naval Postgraduate School Capstone Report, Team Bravo, “Viable Short-Term Directed Energy 
Weapon Naval Solutions: A Systems Analysis of Current Prototypes,” June 2013. 
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the ability to interpret and write SQL statements. In VRDM, relationships are defined by 
the Vector object in a web based graphical interface. 
 
 Vectors are assigned to an X-type and filter by References. Figure 18. 
References are Elements in the X-type that are assigned in the 
Vector. 
Vector References are Elements assigned to a Vector that serve as filters for 
values retrieved from an Element. The order a Vector filters values corresponds to the 
order References are assigned to the Vector. References are objects assigned to Vectors, 
just as Vectors are objects assigned to X-types. 
Self-referencing Vector Elements are Elements that are assigned a Vector. Such a 
Vector contains a Reference that is the Persistent Element of the X-type’s context. In 
other words, the X-type context is defined by a self-referencing Vector. A self-
referencing Element can be thought of as the primary key for the X-type. Each X-type 
must have a self-referencing Vector Element if cross X-type correlation is desired. The 
self-referencing Vector Element generally has the same name as the parent X-type. 
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4. Visual 
The GINA kernel is a module that runs in the DotNetNuke (DNN) environment. 
DNN links Internet Information Services (IIS) to an underlying SQL database. DNN is a 
software framework that runs on Microsoft Windows. It provides language 
interoperability across several programming languages that includes a graphical user 
interface as a user friendly front end with connectivity to a MSSQL server backend.131 
Core GINA database authentication is provided by DNN configuration. Information 
derived from the VRDM semantic layer is presented by DNN in both Forms and Queries, 
and operations are performed as commands and services. The Forms displayed by DNN 
are the primary UI for displaying and configuring a VRDM information configuration. 
Forms consist of Windows, Panes, and Fields. There are three basic types of 
Windows: Authority Window, Resource Window, and Collection Window. The 
Authority Window contains an Element of context. The Resource Window displays the 
Elements in the same row as the Element selected in the Authority Window. The 
collection Window will show all related records specified by a Collection Vector. There 
are two Panes: Navigation and Data. The Authority Window is generally in the 
Navigation pane and the Resource and Collection Windows are generally in the Data 
Pane. Each Window must have a field that is defined by an Element. The contents of the 
Element will display in the field (Figure 19).  
                                                 
131 DotNetNuke is explained at http://www.dnnhero.com/WhatisDotNetNuke.aspx 
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 Above are two tables in two databases. Each table is assigned Figure 19. 
to a Source and columns in the tables are assigned to elements. 
A Collection Vector filters out the one-to-many relationship 
between database 1 and database 2. The result of the 
relationship is viewed in a Collection window. 
Queries in VRDM are a special type of Form that allows a user to define search 
criteria and sort database information using only configuration and no SQL code (Figure 
20). A query can include Elements of any X-type. This simplifies data analysis from a 
complex task to a series of easily trainable steps. For purposes of this domain application, 
Forms and Queries make it possible to correlate and analyze data from many different 
cybersecurity products with inherent integration of the framework. 
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 Queries are displayed in a form that is common to web based Figure 20. 
information management systems. Queries can be customized 
as a configuration in a graphical user interface. This query 
shows Accumulator values for a particular IP address. 
Commands are objects that invoke services defined in X-types (Figure 21). When 
a Command is assigned to a Form, it appears as a button that can be invoked on the Form. 
The behavior of the button is specified within a Command Collection. A Command 
Collection is designated within the UI to organize Commands used for a particular 
process. Each Command in a Command Collection is designated a service that runs when 
the Command is executed. 
 
 A Command is a button that is attached to a form. The Figure 21. 
Command properties define the form where the button will 
appear and the Service the button will launch. 
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Services are objects contained in X-types and are assigned Child Services, 
Directives, and Transforms. Services are configured within an X-type (Figure 22). A 
Service is the action behind the Command “GO” button attached to Forms. 
 
 The Service configuration window names the Service, defines Figure 22. 
what the Service does, and where the Service is located. 
 Child Services exist as Service Maps, otherwise perceived as a chain of Services 
that run in succession. A Service Map organizes services by X-type and Vector, and 
allows a user to specify under what condition (e.g., a threshold value) a service will be 
invoked. The condition can be implicitly defined in a source column or as a relative value 
in an Element.  
Transforms modify values in an Element based on certain defined criteria (Figure 
23). Data can be copied between Elements, appended, and arithmetically altered. The 
Transform is where the magic happens. Services can be chained together in sequence, 
each with an arithmetical operation, to solve complex statistical functions. The end of the 
Service Chain can use a final transform to copy the result to an Element. The Element 
can be used in a part of a larger computational operation.  
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 The Transform configuration defines how an Element is Figure 23. 
modified. The transform above adds the value in the 
TotalWeight Element to the Total Element. 
Directives are service actions invoked by Transforms and are specific to the 
underlying code of a Content Manager Class. Directives consist of several familiar 
preconfigured operations such as delete, execute, read, save, etc. Directives differ from 
normal commands in that they are sometimes chained together (viz, 
“readThenCopyThenTransformDirective”) (Figure 24). Transforms use Directives to 




 Directives are computational operations; they can be chained Figure 24. 
together as a single object, or applied individually. Above are 
a few of the directives that are preconfigured in the UI. 
5. Security 
A GINA implementation of VRDM uses three core components: MSSQL, DNN, 
and IIS. Each component has individual security implementations; they collectively 
contribute to the overall security of VRDM. According to Frank Busalacchi, “GINA 
communication with any remote database is entirely dependent upon the connection 
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configuration and the protocol supported by the database.”132 VRDM authentication is 
managed by DNN for the web UI and connections to remote databases. There are 26 
known vulnerabilities in prior DNN versions listed in the National Vulnerability 
Database.133 The known vulnerabilities are mostly of the cross site scripting type that is 
mitigated simply by blocking access to the web UI. A VRDM CTRC UI is not intended 
for public Internet exposure. 
VRDM security is inherited from the underlying database connections. 
Authentication to remote databases is specified with credentials that are securely stored in 
a MSSQL server table. VRDM configurations are modeled in DNN, and are consequently 
native to Microsoft SQL server. MSSQL server security implementations use Secure 
Socket Layer (SSL) and Internet Protocol Security (IPSec).134 The encryption strength 
supported by native MSSQL in the framework architecture is a 128-bit SSL. ODBC 
connection strings vary for disparate database types. A connection string used in a 
Connection for a MySQL server formats authentication strings for the MySQL ODBC 
driver and defines the path to the SSL certificate required for remote MySQL database 
communication. MySQL databases are typically secured with Open SSL.135 
DNN is an IIS application that uses IIS integrated Active Server Page (ASP).NET 
functionality. MSSQL database authentication information required for DNN is stored in 
the “web.conf” file on the IIS server. Plaintext authentication credentials are stored by 
default in the web.conf file, and are encrypted with Rivest, Shamir, Adleman (RSA) 
using the ASP.NET IIS Registration Tool. The authentication credentials are decrypted 
when the configuration file is read by IIS.136 RSA keys are stored with the protection of 
                                                 
132 Frank Busalacchi, e-mail message to GINA author, August 19, 2014. 
133 The National Vulnerability Database CVE details can be found at 
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/search-results?query=dotnetnuke&search_type=all&cves=on 
134 SQL server encryption capabilities are outlined at http://technet.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/ms189067(v=sql.105).aspx 
135 A complete list of OpenSSL cypher suites can be found at 
https://www.openssl.org/docs/apps/ciphers.html 
136 Detailed information about the ASP.NET IIS Registration Tool can be found at 
http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/vstudio/zhhddkxy(v=vs.100).aspx 
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New Technology File System (NTFS) access control lists (ACL). NTFS ACLs are a 
security feature of the underlying Windows Server operating system.137 
VRDM does not provide integrated security and instead relies on security features 
of DNN, IIS, and MSSQL. The accreditation and certification process for VRDM 
implementations is simplified because of inherited security controls. Accordingly, 
Dragon Pulse Information Management System (DPIMS) specification of GINA is 
DIACAP certified for MAC I classified systems.138 
I. CONCLUSION 
The VRDM information modeling environment presented in this chapter 
demonstrates systems integration and the possibility of creating threat detection 
configurations through configuration of component objects in a web browser UI. In 
VRDM, simple data-driven decision making may be aggregated, weighted and correlated 
just as a human would process data, thus it is it is possible to  
1. Create a weighted decision configuration capable of determining cyber 
threats based on reasonable suspicion  
2. Integrate results from active tests or triggers  
3. Create additional derived information for use in decision making 
As computer network defense systems become increasingly complex, they also 
become increasingly more difficult to update and maintain. Cyber investigations benefit 
from increases in information and thus benefit from the integration of more systems used 
for automated analysis. To evolve detection and protection capabilities beyond response 
to pre-programmed signatures of known attacks, cognitive decision-making can be used 
to incorporate suspicion as a trigger to begin analysis of all sources of information.  
  
                                                 
137 Detailed information on RSA key access control can be found at http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-
us/library/vstudio/yxw286t2(v=vs.100).aspx 
138 Assurance Certification and Accreditation (IA C&A) authorization to operate DPIMS version 5.0, 
APMS # DA207735, Mar 2012. 
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III. CYBER THREAT DETECTION AND RESPONSE 
CONFIGURATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is two-fold: first, to describe a VRDM-enabled cyber 
threat protection configuration and second, to propose and develop an expert decision 
process configuration for cyber threat analysis. The CTRC proposed is an example of 
many possible configurations, which could be devised to aggregate multiple intrusion 
protection systems into an extensible composite system. The CTRC operates on the 
premise that information between disparate systems can be shared where one or more 
common communication paths enable the convergence and process description of the 
configuration. The enabling GINA architecture includes a SQL content server and native 
ODBC connections (GINA configuration in Appendix E). This architecture was chosen 
because the information configurations do not require programming. Instead, VRDM 
information configurations are configured.  
There are four key components to this CTRC: inputs, threat monitor, decision 
processes, and a responder. This CTRC aggregates information from a Microsoft SQL-
based packet capture database (configuration procedure is in Appendix A), a Linux web 
server log database (configuration procedure is in Appendix B), a Linux network scanner 
database (NMAP configuration is in Appendix C), a Linux syslog database, and a 
Windows event database (Event Scavenger 5 and Rsyslog configurations are in Appendix 
D). The CTRC makes threat classifications as a function of suspicion, based on a 
weighted decision specification. Threat response is possible where common 
communication nodes exist between network hardware and a VRDM analytic engine. 
This portion of the CTRC uses VRDM’s inherent capability to invoke a command shell 
with command line arguments. A response mechanism was devised as a set of scripted 
commands to industry standard network hardware. The sequence of events from the 
initial cyber-attack, to data analysis and threat detection, ending in threat response is 
specified explicitly within the VRDM information configuration. 
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A composite CTRC in shown in Figure 26. It is decomposed in to three distinct 
decision configurations of increasing complexity. The SoS hyper graph in Figure 25 
illustrates the constituent and extended components for CTRC. It is noted here that only 
the specified data attributes from the systems shown to be intersecting the GINA 
framework are ingested and used as data objects in VRDM (Figure 25). A detailed flow 
diagram is illustrated in Figure 26. The configuration is an executable implementation of 
the network monitoring cycle (viz., collection, detection, and analysis.) 
 
 Above is a CTRC SoS hyper graph. The network available Figure 25. 
system components are represented as spheres whose native 
information may be utilized as component objects in a VRDM 
information configuration. Configurations are represented as 
ellipses and show interactions between system components. 
B. INPUTS 
Uses of the GINA framework enables rapid VRDM aggregation of multiple 
databases into a virtual “table” that contains all desired information from multiple 
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network data sources. Aggregation is accomplished by syntactic normalization at the 
boundary and accommodates every necessary data standard. This is semantically 
normalized at the configuration Element and enables all data to be available for semantic 
object information configurations in VRDM. Each column of a table in a database is 
mapped to an Element. The Elements are created within X-types that are related by 
Vectors. The CTRC Vectors use References that are specified Elements, which act as 
filters that match Elements to other related Elements across X-types. The Elements with 
Vector relationships in this CTRC integration are the source IP, destination IP, source 
port, destination port, and timestamp. The Snort database output plugin comes 
preconfigured with columns that represented components of a socket pair and requires 
multi part unique keys in VRDM to relate those columns. Multipart keys are defined in 
VRDM by an Element mapped to a multipart column (shown in Figure 12). Multipart 
Source Columns were defined in a Source as two Column identifiers separated by 
commas (viz., cid,sid). Vector relationships between multiple tables are used to create 
Elements mapped to all desired Sources within a single X-type. The X-type forms a 
relationship between the Elements as if they were all columns in the same table.  
Time is a necessary component to distinguish a unique instance of a socket pair, 
since it is possible that the same socket pair could represent multiple distinct connections. 
Two Reference Elements that represent a time window can be used as a uniquely 
identifying characteristic of a data set. During normalization of time stamps, it was 
necessary to synchronize time at the aggregator and not at the source database. Database 
time synchronization is essential for database correlation.  
Automation of time synchronization can be done with a packet capture by sending 
a uniquely identifiable probe and recording the remote server’s response. A record of the 
probe will appear in sensor logs from an outgoing network interface and in the sensor 
logs of the foreign incoming interface. A difference function between the two time 
stamps can define the offset between the two databases. In the case of a web server where 
no packet capture is available, a uniquely identifiable string in the URL request to the 
web server can be used. The request can be logged to the remote database along with a 
timestamp. 
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During the design of the CTRC, time was a problematic component because 
clocks do not all run at the same speed. In that case, where milliseconds mattered, it was 
important to determine additional identifying characteristics of a network event. 
Additional characteristics were combined as Vector References that included a time 
window, which narrowed the focus of a search query. Time windows are defined in the 
CTRC as two Vector References, where one Reference is a second of time before an 
event and the next Reference is a second after the event time. The Reference operators 
designated values less than the first Reference and greater than the next Reference. The 
combination of the two Vector Elements filtered out all but specified values within a two 
second window. 
Data sources can exist in any format, but ultimately require conversion to a 
database format before being processed into the CTRC. Special parsers were used to 
convert log data and packet captures into database format. This CTRC assumes that 
logging databases remain at the initial data source while only specific columns are read 
into the CTRC. As a result, network traffic, processing load, and data storage remain at 
the edge of the network architecture (sensor back end databases), with the lightest load 
possible in the architecture’s core (e.g., GINA IIS servers and related MSSQL database).  
Source data can come in many forms. The CTRC assumes no limit to the number 
of data sources that can populate any database. Several monitors from multiple networks 
can send logs and packet capture to a single database. There is no limit to the number of 
data sources that can be added into the CTRC. The configuration assumes that all 
incoming data sources exist as database columns. There are five assumptions to CTRC 
interconnectivity: 
 Edge databases can be of any type. 
 The GINA framework enables connections capable of reading any 
database type. 
 An account exists on the remote data source with access rights granted. 
 The configuration may be configured with authentication information to 
access remote data sources. 
 A data path exists to the remote data source. 
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Data formats for similar sources may vary. Integration testing showed that the 
time of day was a common example of formatting disparity. Format conversions required 
for string comparison of column values between databases were avoided by creating a 
‘view’ in the edge database server (procedure outlined in Appendix E-8). Format 
conversions can be configured within VRDM when the data is read into an Element. The 
test configuration specified a database view column as a VRDM Source Column in the 
same manner that database table columns are specified.  
This CTRC correlates data from a Snort network monitor, an Apache web server, 
an NMAP scanner, and system logs. Each of these subcomponents was implemented with 
a backend database. Database implementation instructions for Snort are located in 
Appendix A, Apache web server in Appendix B, NMAP scanner in Appendix C, and 
both Events and Syslogs in Appendix D. VRDM was used to create a correlation between 
the data sources by defining the data in Element form and assigning semantics to each 
column as an Element name. An X-type was mapped to each table and a persistent 
Element was mapped to each column. A Vector relationship existed between the socket 
pair and the timestamp for every packet in the configuration. For example, the 
relationship between the Apache database and a Snort database in Figure 26 is depicted in 
Figure 30. A Vector with References containing the semantic Elements that represent 
source IP, source port, destination IP, destination port, and values within the two second 
time window (previously described) formed the basis of a relationship between the two 
X-types. Using these Vector References, a one-to-many correlation was made between an 
Apache database entry to multiple packets in the Snort database. Additional Vectors can 
similarly relate the Snort database to the NMAP database and the Snort database to the 
event log and syslog databases. In this manner, databases can be interrelated by reusing 
the same Vectors in context with each X-type. As for the NMAP service, a scan must be 
initiated in order to populate its backend database. GINA can automate this process as a 
service. 
Each process must have a trigger for initiation. IDS preprocessors are vulnerable 
to intentionally transmitted false positives as a method of overwhelming the IDS. A 
characteristic of the CTRC is that it does not individually process every datagram. This 
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CTRC was designed such that an individual event will not be sufficient to trigger a GINA 
process. Instead, batch analysis is used to limit the possibility of DoS on the underlying 
architecture. Within each batch of data, a predefined signal will start a specific decision 
configuration process. 
In the CTRC, a trigger occurs when criteria for a threat is met. Events captured 
from network monitoring systems that do not alert an individual system can combine 
from multiple systems as sufficient to meet a composite threshold. The configuration 
assumes no limit to possible inputs that could be used as trigger stimuli. This CTRC uses 
a timer to regularly scan events, alerts, logs, and packet captures together for a trigger. 
The CTRC was designed to respond to both machine-generated alerts and specified 
criteria. 
 IDS alerts—Alerts and packet captures can be simultaneously written to 
multiple databases.139 The current implementation assumes that the IDS 
was configured to log alerts and packet captures to a single database.  
 Specified criteria—All data is not created equal, and should not be 
afforded equal protection.140 At times it may be necessary to specify 
specific character strings known to be of greater value when under certain 
conditions. We do not know the exact PHP file that has an exploitable 
vulnerability, but we do know directories where those files are stored. For 
instance an administrator may assume that access to a file in the 
“phpmyadmin” directory is a threat, but only if it originates from an 
obfuscated IP address or during a directory traversal scan from the same 
source identity. 
 Syslogs & events—Linux servers generate syslogs and Windows servers 
generate events. Repeated event log audit failures should cause suspicion 
and invoke additional vetting of the culprit identity. Correlation with 
network transaction logs can quickly identify other areas touched by the 
suspect identity where event log success audits may exist. 
Excessive triggers can overwhelm any system. Multiple repetitions of the same 
attack can come from the same source. It was necessary to prevent repeat triggers from 
overwhelming the CTRC by limiting threat detection to an identity-specific sequence. 
                                                 
139 Toby Kohlenberg, Raven Alder, Everett F. Carter Jr. and James C. Foster, Snort IDS and IPS Toolkit 
(Burlington: Syngress Publishing, 2007), 99. 
140 Winn Schwartau, Time Based Security (Seminole, FL: Interpact Press, 1999), 82. 
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The effects of duplicate triggers overwhelming the CTRC were mitigated with a state 
table. This CTRC was designed to maintain a memory of each specific source IP address 
that meets threshold criteria such that repeats are not evaluated in a particular evaluation 
cycle. By design, the threat table appends a timestamp to the source IP address so the 
CTRC will re-evaluate the IP address on the next evaluation cycle. The state table can be 
configured to delete stale records after a specified amount of time. 
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 In the Cyber Threat Response Configuration. Packet capture, system logs, and web logs are checked for Figure 26. 
threshold values and pattern matches. The Accumulator ensures that the decisions can be weighted without 
the requirement of programming complex logic trees. The configuration can be rapidly reconfigured in a 
user interface. 
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C. DECISION PROCESS 
The hypothesis of this thesis is that VRDM can model a human investigative 
process. Changing the way data is analyzed generally requires changing code in analysis 
software. Better, more effective methods of analysis can be implemented continuously as 
a change in configuration specification rather than a costly change in code. As a result, a 
VRDM information configuration can evolve with cyber threats by redefining trigger 
criteria in the specification. 
Trigger criteria for the CTRC can be pre-defined or a behavior anomaly. Pre-
defined criteria include rule sets, virus definitions, known bad “bits,” or string values 
unique to the system (viz., a system password traversing an outbound interface). There 
are two basic sources of predefined malicious activity: machine generated and manually 
input. Machine generated alerts can come from IDS alerts, Net Nanny black lists, Cyber 
Patrol notifications, McAffee ePO, Microsoft security bulletins, the National Security 
Vulnerability Database, etc. Though any one of these sources is not sufficient to provide 
maximum protection, integration of all sources can greatly increase probability of threat 
detection.  
Behavior anomalies are generally deviations from the norm. Protocol analysis is 
the strength of the Bro scripting platform and it can alert the presence of non-standard 
protocols on standard ports.141 A Snort plugin named “Spade” can alert anomalies in 
traffic flow.142 The functionality of either of these products can be integrated into the 
CTRC. In some cases, a specific behavior may be desired but the intellectual capital 
required to program that functionality into those products may not be readily available.143 
New behavior definitions can be configured in the GINA environment without the need 
for programming and applied as criteria for detection.  
A weighted decision configuration can be implemented when multiple factors 
must combine to form a reasonable deduction. Weighted decision specifications can be 
                                                 
141 Chris Sanders and Jason Smith, Applied Network Security Monitoring (Waltham, MA: Elsevier, 2014), 256. 
142 Rafeeq U. Rehman, Intrusion Detection with Snort (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 137. 
143 Karen Evans and Franklin Reeder, “A Human Capital Crisis in Cyber security: Technical 
Proficiency Matters,” CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency, November 2010, 
http://csis.org/files/publication/101111_Evans_HumanCapital_Web.pdf. 
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extended to include as many criteria as necessary to infer a reasonable deduction. This 
CTRC assumes that a combination of the following where any two that include the first 
are a threat.  
1. Connection to a protected area or computer asset. 
2. Connection source address is obfuscated.  
3. Scanning activity has occurred from the identity. 
PHP vulnerabilities accounted for 29% of vulnerabilities listed in the National 
Vulnerability Database and accounted for 9% of vulnerabilities in 2013.144 A honeypot 
was established to collect information on attacks against Apache webservers. Analysis of 
the honeypot logs revealed the structure and method of a PHPMyAdmin attack. The 
nature of the attacks gave reason to assume that a threat exists upon access to the 
PHPMyAdmin directory. The website is a web administration tool for a MySQL service 
and by nature protected. PHPMyAdmin attacks exploit several known vulnerabilities in 
PHP configuration files.145 The particular attack signature recorded by the weblogs 
invoked setup.php. The behavior is indicative of vulnerability CVE-2010–3055.146 
Attackers used a brute force scanning tool as a method of reconnaissance in an attempt to 
locate the vulnerable file.147 Each attack had three things in common: several URLs were 
accessed within the same second, numerous URL requests for nonexistent webpages, and 
they all came from the same IP address. In most instances, the attacks originated from an 
anonymity network or a compromised web server. The attacks were easy to visualize 
with inspection of raw log data. The “Fail2ban” program provides a popular mitigation 
                                                 
144 Fabien Coelho, “PHP-related vulnerabilities on the National Vulnerability Database,” September 8, 
2013, http://www.coelho.net/php_cve.html. 
145 Several PHPMyAdmin attack signatures can be found at 
http://www.symantec.com/security_response/attacksignatures/. 
146 Details of the CVE-2010-3055 can be found at 
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2010-3055; A description of the PHPMyAdmin 
attack can be found at http://www.phpmyadmin.net/home_page/security/PMASA-2010-4.php. 
147 OWASP DirBuster is a popular application for bruteforce scan attacks against a web server. 
Details can be found at https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Category:OWASP_DirBuster_Project. 
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for the attack.148 It works by searching for “404 file not found” errors where 
PHPMyAdmin exists in the URL column. In the case of a match the IP address of the 
program blocks the attacker on the host firewall.149 The program is specific to a Linux 
environment and requires moderate scripting knowledge to implement correctly. VRDM 
can be used to configure the behavior of “Fail2Ban” in a platform-independent process 
without any knowledge of Apache web servers or scripting languages. In the case that a 
brute force scan succeeds, access of files within protected areas can be found in syslog 
database records and correlated to a web request time and filename. Correlation of system 
logs, web logs, and network packet captures can provide sufficient evidence to deduce 
exploitation of unknown vulnerabilities by searching for suspicious behavior. There are 
three components in the CTRC, an Accumulator, Threat Monitor, and Responder.  
1. Accumulator 
Sometimes it is necessary to derive additional information to augment readily 
available packet capture and log data. Computations of averages, differences, 
summations, comparisons, and variants of each can produce additional sources of data to 
enhance a decision making process. VRDM must have a “memory” of data in order to 
derive non-persistent data from persistent data sources. The result of a calculation must 
be saved for later comparison operations. Each result of a string of pattern matches is a 
decision. The CTRC remembers each decision in order to build upon the next using an 
Accumulator X-type. The results of each decision in a multi-part decision configuration 
are saved and then a summation of the “scores” from each decision is saved in the X-
type. The total will or will not meet a decision threshold that was determined by 
evaluating patterns in a manual analysis process.  
The Accumulator is a special X-type necessary to maintain threat identity state 
through decision configurations. This CTRC creates inferences that will result in 
deductions to new information. Each step through a decision results in a score where a 
                                                 
148 A method for scripting a remediation is outlined in 
http://www.fail2ban.org/wiki/index.php/HOWTO_apache_myadmin_filter. 
149 Information on Fail2Ban can be found at http://www.fail2ban.org/wiki/index.php/Main_Page. 
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summation can infer the reasonable deduction of threat. The Accumulator is the memory 
of results generated from a series of test conditions that support a conclusion. The 
Accumulator is an implementation where any of several test criteria alone are not 
sufficient to warrant determination of a true positive, but the combination of certain 
criteria can infer there is sufficient evidence to validate a positive as true. A familiar 
example of this concept would be a specification for connection validation where a user, 
logged in in the middle of the night, downloading a large amount of data, from areas he 
generally does not access, all at the same time, should be suspect; but each individually 
should not. The specified process Accumulator is a way to implement suspicion as a 
method of detection and mitigation of many types of unusual behavior by polling data 
historical from different sources. In this CTRC, Tor was arbitrarily chosen as a weighted 
Accumulator specification, and PHPMyAdmin with scripted directory traversal scanning 
or an obfuscated addresses were arbitrarily chosen as a conditional Accumulator 
specification. 
Each CTRC consists of an X-type with Elements that represent results for each 
test condition. Decision X-types can have Elements sourced to separate database tables 
spanning multiple servers to take advantage of distributed processing. The Accumulator 
can be used to determine the probability of directory traversal scanning, source IP 
spoofing, and address obfuscation presence. 
Directory traversal is a moderately effective method of footprinting a website which 
can lead to enumeration of website vulnerabilities.150 Snort preprocessors are capable of 
detecting scanning activity and are susceptible to false positive DoS from spoofed IP 
addresses. Two decision configurations that can together detect directory traversal scanning 
and determine if the source IP address is spoofed are presented in Figure 27 and Figure 28. 
The Directory Traversal Detection Configuration retrieves data from a single X-type and 
the Spoof Detection Configuration correlates data from two X-types. A directory traversal 
configuration is outlined in Table 1 and illustrated in Figure 27. 
  
                                                 
150 Stuart McClure, Joel Scambray and George Kurtz, Hacking Exposed: Network Security Secrets & 
Solutions. 7th ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 2012), 13. 
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Step Decision configuration YES response 
A Do two “404” exist in the WebLogs.Status 
column with the same value in the 
Weblogs.RemoteIP column? 
Compare Tstmp values 
B Are values in the WebLogs.Tstmp column 
equal? 
Compare URL 
C Are the values in the WebLogs.URL column 
equal? 
User clicked refresh button 
twice in the same second. False 
positive. 
Table 1.   Directory traversal sequence 
 
 The above directory traversal detection sequence searches for Figure 27. 
common characteristics of brute force website scanning. This 
configuration maintains an X-type in memory with a Service 
that checks for two 404 strings in the status column in a 
WebLogs table of a web log database that both have the same 
source IP value, timestamp value, and do not have the same 
URL value. If found the configuration will increment the 
CTRC Accumulator by 1. 
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The directory traversal detection configuration was designed to detect when a 
“404” exists twice in the Status column, timestamps are equal, and have a Source IP in 
common. This sequence uses pattern matches to determine if an event is related to 
another event. Once a relationship is established, it is necessary to determine if the URL 
values are also equal. A comparison of URL (Apache) to URL (Accumulator) will 
determine if the URL request is changing faster than a human can type a change in the 
address bar. URLs rapidly changing and requesting resources that do not exist are 
reasonably suspect as automated directory traversal scan attacks.  
Note that scanning behavior is not a blockable offense in this CTRC; if it were; 
the configuration would simply block an IP address based on the scanning behavior and 
create an easy vector for a false positive DoS. Scanning behavior in conjunction with 
PHPMyAdmin URL requests are assumed a threat in this CTRC if a valid TCP 
handshake exists. Database correlation is required to determine if a valid handshake 
exists per an Apache event. An “ack” with the source address of the web server indicates 
that a three way TCP handshake has completed.151 By design, the Snort database output 
module logs an ack in a decimal representation of binary 16 from an outgoing interface. 
Vector relationships between the Apache X-type and the Snort X-types can relate the 
flags Element to the url Element. A simple comparison can determine if a valid TCP 
session exists for the PHPMyAdmin request. Spoofed IP addresses do not complete three 
way handshakes because reply packets go to the owner of the spoofed IP address. The 
true owner of the IP address will respond with a reset packet and will not complete the 
handshake. Without a handshake detection process, attackers can DoS an IPS with false 
positives. The spoof detection configuration will increment the CTRC Accumulator by 
one if a valid TCP session is detected and PHPMyAdmin is in the URL column. A spoof 
detection configuration is outlined in Table 2 and illustrated in Figure 28. 
  
                                                 
151 A complete description of the TCP handshake process is detailed in Behrouz A. Forouzan, TCP/IP 
Protocol Suite, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2010), 443. 
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Step Decision configuration YES response 
A phpmyadmin detected in the URL column Check for valid session 
B Does 16 exist in the related tcp_flags 
column?  
A valid session exists. Increment 
CTR Accumulator by 1. 
Table 2.   Spoof detection sequence 
 
 Above is a spoof detection sequence configuration. It uses Figure 28. 
information between two tables to determine if source IP 
address is spoofed by checking for an “ack” in the packet 
capture. When no ack exists recorded from the outgoing 
interface to match a TCP connection on an incoming interface, 
then spoofing is highly suspected. 
A series of decision operations was intended to combine the passive effectiveness 
of intrusion detection systems (IDS) with the active effectiveness of running various tests 
against a suspect cyber threat. A determined attacker may leave no proof positive answer 
during an investigation. Many pieces of circumstantial evidence can sometimes be as 
implicating as a single conclusive piece of evidence. The cyber threat configuration can 
include many moderate probability methods of detection into an aggregate of higher true 
positive potential. This spoof detection configuration reasonably concludes that spoofing 
has occurred but obfuscation is harder to detect. 
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One source of address obfuscation is anonymity networks. Anonymity network 
detection may be reasonably assured by combining both active and passive methods of 
traffic analysis into a weighted decision configuration with variable weights. The CTRC 
demonstrates a weighted decision archetype as a best effort to detect connections 
originating from an anonymity network. The Obfuscation Detection Configuration in 
Figure 31 demonstrates a way to configure a differential investigative process to test for 
conditions found common to connections originating from known anonymity networks. 
Some test conditions are more suspect than others and, as a result, the Obfuscation 
Accumulator is incremented by a number consummate with suspicion. When the 
Obfuscation Accumulator contains a row sum of four, there is sufficient suspicion to 
assume that obfuscation is present. Exceptions to the generalization can also be 
configured by adding additional decision points.  
“Attribution can be greatly increased if one uses active measures.”152 Information 
can be gathered by scanning a source IP address that may allow for the identification of 
connections originating from behind anonymity networks prior to an attack. Probes for 
scanning and enumeration of source addresses can create an additional data source 
required to determine if packet capture logs contain legitimate data. Generating traffic to 
compare round trip time, TTL values, sequence numbers, window sizes, and other 
identifying packet attributes can reasonably reveal the use of an obfuscation network. A 
port probe can be used to identify anonymizing services such as Tor (that uses registered 
port 9001 by default). A port probe to the source IP address port 9001 that returns a syn-
ack generally indicates Tor is in operation at the source address. Upon reply, the probe 
will also reveal the round trip time from the web server to the source IP address. Servers 
generally have open ports, client machines behind a home router generally do not, unless 
port forwarding is enabled on the home router. Generally, open ports indicate that a 
server exists at the address. It is reasonable to assume that server browsing is suspicious.  
Port enumeration is an effective method used to determine services on a remote 
server. Anonymizing services can operate on ports that are not registered. Port scanning 
                                                 
152 James A. Lewis, “Conflict and Negotiation in Cyberspace,” Center for Strategic & International 
Studies, February 2013, http://csis.org/files/publication/130208_Lewis_ConflictCyberspace_Web.pdf, 47. 
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the source IP address will reveal open ports that could be used for Tor communications. 
A specially crafted series of packets to emulate a Tor hand shake can be sent to the 
source IP and an expected Tor response will yield conclusive evidence that Tor is present 
on the source IP address. VRDM is a tool capable of referencing sequence and 
acknowledgement numbers from a half open port scan packet capture in a database. It 
may be possible to apply those numbers to a packet generator program in order to 
generate a TCP packet data stream to elicit an identifying reply. 
Passive detection is faster because it does not involve the inherent latency in 
response time to probe remote servers. Logs record received packet information, but they 
do not guarantee the information is correct. Attackers can use packet generators to change 
the characteristics of packets to defeat traditional IDS. It remains wise to scrutinize 
source IP addresses for suspect characteristics. A list of Tor exit nodes is publicly 
available at http://torstatus.blutmagie.de/. Comparison of the source IP address against a 
regularly imported list of publicly advertised exit nodes may produce a match. An IP 
address listed on the public directory of Tor servers generally indicates Tor is running on 
that IP address. 
TTL values from logged packets and probe reply packets from the same IP 
address should be similar and variance implies IP spoofing has occurred.153 The 
discrepancy may also be attributed to the very nature of the dynamic routing protocols 
organic to the Internet and therefore it cannot alone implicate that network obfuscation is 
present.154 TTLs from Linux operating systems generally start at 64 and decrement and 
Windows operating system TTLs generally start at 128 and decrement.155 92% of 
publicly advertised Tor exit nodes operate on Linux.156 Windows operating systems 
                                                 
153 Kimberly Graves, Certified Ethical Hacker Study Guide Indianapolis: Wiley Publishing, 2010. 
154 M. Javed (2013).Towards Illuminating a Censorship Monitor’s Model to Facilitate Evasion. In The 
ICSI Networking and Security Group. Retrieved May 9, 2014, from 
http://www.icir.org/vern/papers/censorship-model.foci13.pdf. 
155 Common OS initial TTL values can be found at 
http://www.kellyodonnell.com/content/determining-os-type-ping. 
156 A list of all Tor exit nodes and corresponding operating systems can be found at 
http://torstatus.blutmagie.de/. 
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maintain a market share of 91% versus a Linux at 2%.157 Traffic from a Linux computer 
is suspect, but not indicative in of itself to deduce Tor obfuscation.  
Round Trip Time (RTT) is calculated as a difference function between the 
timestamps of two packets with inverse socket pairs and where the acknowledgement 
number of one matches the sequence number of the other. A high discrepancy between 
calculated and probe reply RTT strongly indicates anonymity networks because traffic is 
relayed several hops beyond the exit node to the source machine, possibly over a 
worldwide path.158 
Network Address Translation (NAT) proxy use can be detected in web logs. 
Connections from behind a shared proxy demonstrate non-congruent source ports in web 
logs. Connections from behind a private proxy demonstrate generally sequential source 
port numbers in web logs. Each of the 80 known Tor nodes tested demonstrated 
characteristics of non-sequential source port numbers. Until an exception is found, it is 
reasonable to assume that connections with sequential port numbers do not originate from 
Tor nodes. Figure 29 illustrates the concept. 
  
                                                 
157 Operating system market share data can be found at http://netmarketshare.com/. 
158 An overview of Tor can be found at https://www.torproject.org/about/overview. 
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 Logs from two test connections to a web server. The red box Figure 29. 
shows port numbers from a computer that connected to a web 
server using Tor. The blue box shows port numbers from the 
same computer without Tor. The blue port numbers are less 
random and the red ones are more random. 
A combination of passive and active intrusion detection information can be 
aggregated with VRDM and can increase the reliability of log and sensor data. The 
Obfuscation Detection Configuration (ODC) combines data sources from five databases 
and ten X-types. Some data was derived by calculating values and populating a 
“calculations” X-type. Calculations consist of port difference, RTT, average TTL, TTL 
difference, and RTT difference. The Element relationships are illustrated in Figure 30. 
Figure 30 also serves as a graphic to bring all three subcomponents of the CTRC together 




 CTRC information process - The red circles show where Figure 30. 
passive and active data are combined to create new data. The 
green circles show where arithmetical functions are performed 
on passive data to create new data. The red arrows traversing 
the same X-types together are a vector. All tables use 
timestamp as a Vector reference (not shown for simplicity). 
Purple arrows indicate calculated data. The database on the 
right is a VRDM integrated database that stores values from 
all decision configurations and calculations thereof. 
Port congruency is determined by computing the average change in RemotePort 
Elements that are related to the same RemoteIP, SvrIP, and SvrPort. An Element 
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containing a subtraction operator and the two RemotePort Elements returns the integer 
distance between source port numbers. Source ports are generally sequential when no 
shared proxy is between the web server and the client and source ports vary widely when 
a proxy is present. Tests concluded that continued port deviation greater than 50 is strong 
evidence the source address is behind a shared proxy.  
RTT is determined by computing the difference between the timestamp Elements 
that are related to the same tcp_seq and tcp_ack Elements and are uniquely identified by 
socket pair within a time range. An Element containing a subtraction operator and the 
two time stamp Elements as first and second Element terms is effectively an RTT 
Element. A transform applied to a CalculatedRTT Element which is mapped to a 
calculations table will copy the value of the RTT Element into the calculations table. 
Average TTL is calculated by saving two TTL values from the ip_ttl Element 
from an equal socket pair. An ip_ttlSum Element will sum the two ip_ttl values. An 
AverageTTL Element will use ip_ttlSum as the first Element term, a division operator, 
and 2 as the second element term. This averages the two ip_ttl values. A Transform 
copies the instance of the AverageTTL Element to the AvgTTL persistent Element in the 
Calculations X-type.  
TTL difference is calculated as a TTLDiff Element that consists of ip_ttl and TTL 
as the first and second Element terms with a subtraction operator. Likewise, the RTT 
difference is calculated as an RTTDiff Element that consists of RTT and CalcRTT as the 
first and second Element terms with a subtraction operator. 
Calculated values are applied to a Calculations table using a transform each in 
context to the related source IP address. The new information in the Calculations X-type 
can be used to populate an Accumulator X-type through each step of a decision 
configuration per each related source IP address. There are eight steps in the ODC. This 
process is outlined in Table 3 and illustrated in Figure 31.  
Detection of Tor was an arbitrary example to demonstrate source address 
validation in a weighted decision specification. Table 3 explains combinations that form a 
reasonable assumption that Tor is in use when the sum of the Accumulator test weights is 
greater than 3. A traffic norm was established by testing several connections that were 
using Tor and those that were not using Tor. The differences found in the TTL, RTT, port 
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variance (Figure 29), and Tor exit node statistics discussed earlier were used as suspect 
criteria. Computers operating from legitimate proxies did not have open ports, but 
connections from Tor proxies did. Furthermore, round trip time of packets was at least 
two times greater with a computer using Tor than when the same computer did not use 
Tor. This variance in round trip time indicates two things, the remote node was slow at 
the time of access and was not slow in time for the ping reply; or a proxy is relaying a 
transmission that has a higher transmission propagation delay to the end point, but not at 
the proxy because a large geographic distance exists between the two. As a simple proof 
of concept, these few criteria were weighted based on how likely a legitimate user would 
exhibit the same traits. Since 91% of Internet surfers are using Windows operating 
systems, 92% of Tor exit nodes operate on Linux, 2% of Internet surfers are using Linux, 
and 100% Tor exit nodes are public proxies; it is unlikely that a legitimate user would use 
a Linux server that is operating behind a public proxy to browse a protected asset, all at 
the same time, but very likely that a Tor proxy was being used. The threshold value could 
be set to three in order to catch this combination (step B, C, and G). But it would also 
catch the off chance of a momentarily slow Linux computer (step E and C). A higher 
value reflects greater specificity; in this case, a threshold value of 4 was chosen to lower 
the number of false positives even though more false negatives are possible.  
A momentarily slow Linux server operating behind a public proxy that connects 
to a protected asset would yield a value of 5 (true responses to step B, C, E, and G). It is 
not in dispute that false positives are possible in this case, but it is far more likely that this 
combination represents a Tor exit node and is a true positive. Likewise a momentarily 
slow Linux server connecting to a protected asset would yield a value of 4 (true responses 
to step C, E, and G), but it is still far more likely that this combination is a private Tor 
exit node and a true positive. A momentarily slow Windows server operating behind a 
public proxy would yield a value of 4 (true responses to step B, E, and G), but it is fair to 
assume that this is more likely a Tor exit node than not because servers generally do not 
browse protected assets from public proxies. In the off chance that a legitimate user 
connects with this unusual combination of properties, an exception can be configured into 
the specification. Tests F and A instantly increment the Accumulator to 4 because both 
are known attributes of Tor servers.  
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Step Decision configuration YES response 
A Does the source IP address of a packet 
exist in the known Tor nodes column? 
Increment Obfuscation Accumulator by 4 
(Known Tor source address) 
B Is source TCP port change greater 
than 50? 
Increment Obfuscation Accumulator by 1 
(Indicates proxy is in use) 
C Is the average TTL < 65? Increment Obfuscation Accumulator by 1 
(Indicates Linux is in use) 
D Is PBNJDB TTL != iphdr ip_ttl? Increment Obfuscation Accumulator by 2 
(Indicates tunnel is in use) 
E Is CTRC calculatedRTT > 2x 
PBNJDB RTT?  
Increment Obfuscation Accumulator by 2 
(Indicates relays are in use) 
F Is 9001 in the PBNJDB port column? Increment Obfuscation Accumulator by 4 
(Known Tor port is in use) 
G Do ports exist in the PBNJDB port 
column? 
Increment Obfuscation Accumulator by 1 
(Indicates a remote server) 
H Is Obfuscation Accumulator > 3? Increment CTRC Accumulator by 1  
(Indicates source IP is obfuscated) 
Table 3.   Obfuscation detection sequence 
 
 A weighted obfuscation detection sequence. Each decision has Figure 31. 
a weight consummate with a theoretical degree of suspicion. 
When the threshold value of 4 is reached, obfuscation network 
traffic is suspected. 
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2. Threat Monitor 
The Threat Monitor is a GINA service that checks the totals from the 
Accumulator X-type for the presence of threshold values per threat. It can be thought of 
as a queue for decisions that is checked by a GINA service at regular intervals. The 
Threat Monitor maintains state as the Accumulator inserts values into the Elements that 
represent the outcome of each decision point. When threshold values trigger a threat 
during an Accumulator scan, the Threat Monitor can update a special Element within the 
Accumulator decision result set that indicates a decision has been reached. It will 
consequently cancel the sequence of compare operations. In the case that a decision is 
taking too long to complete, the Threat Monitor uses a predefined timeout value to stop 
the process and free up system resources. This timeout value is defined in the web.conf 
file and can be increased if additional SQL Server processing time is required. The 
responder is initiated when the Threat Monitor detects a threshold value in the 
Accumulator’s summation row. Each Accumulator must have a Threat Monitor. 
3. Responder 
The Responder is a special VRDM form that can run one or more actions per 
response invoked by a GINA service chain. It selects the action appropriate based on a 
predefined process schedule. It accesses data from source Elements in the threat monitor 
and inserts the values into a responder form. GINA command line execution capability 
allows communication over arbitrary protocols for maximum interoperability. The 
configuration assumes capability of unlimited responses and responder systems without 
the need for programming.  
Generally, intrusion protection systems (IPS) such as firewalls, access control 
lists, and security proxies, forward or block network traffic based on a predetermined rule 
set that is located on the individual network hardware component. The CTRC responder 
functions as an intrusion detection and prevention system (IDPS) that integrates all 
network IPS hardware into a single composite IDPS. In this manner, VRDM can send IP 
addresses, MAC addresses, host names, ports, and protocols as inputs to customizable 
scripts. The scripts use the inputs to generate protection commands specifically for an 
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automated response. SSH commands can be remotely executed on routers, switches, and 
servers to the extent of any size network, simultaneously, to mitigate any scale of attack 
at computer speed.  
SSH is a protocol used for secure communications between a wide range of 
network devices including routers, switches, and servers. The CTRC is designed to 
invoke Plink159 to send SSH commands to routers and switches. The SSH commands 
block malicious traffic originating from outside the network as well as inside (behind the 
firewall). Plink can be used to send SSH commands via a command line interface to any 
SSH-aware network device (switch, router, server). The CTRC can pull any number of 
available network connection details from logs and IDS databases and forward them as 
command line arguments to a batch file. The arguments are positioned within the batch 
file using argument variables to create a specific command line execution. Batch files can 
execute multiple commands on SSH devices when initiated from a single GINA 
operation. Responses to the threat can include but are not exclusive to:  
 Send an email 
 Perform a scripted procedure using command line arguments as inputs 
 Backup user data and reimage computer with Symantec Ghost 
 Block a switch port with an SSH command 
 Update firewall tables to block a connection with SSH commands 
 Update HIDS firewalls with policy update commands 
 Automatically create custom snort rule with a scripted procedure 
 Update access control lists list on router with SSH commands 
 Update routing tables (send connection to honeypot) with SSH commands 
Vyatta and Cisco network devices implement system changes in a configuration 
mode. Problems with single line Plink statements are overcome by using the GINA 
                                                 
159 Information about Plink can be found at 
http://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/0.52/htmldoc/Chapter7.html. 
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command line feature. A command line argument is forwarded to a batch file that first 
writes output to a separate text file identified by the argument then uses the text file as 
input to a Plink command. The unique text file is created with all commands necessary to 
change the configuration of SSH enabled network hardware. A lightweight “Runas.exe” 
program can be used to ensure proper credentials are relayed to Plink. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The configurations in this chapter are an example of one way to use composite 
suspicion as a method of intrusion detection. In addition, the chapter explained how to 
specify a configuration to implement that method in VRDM. Any criteria can be 
combined and weighted in a VRDM environment using an Accumulator X-type and 
Threat Monitor. GINA Services can be used to invoke probes to remote network 
hardware. The probe response can create additional information about the remote node. 
The combination of the information produces the actionable intelligence necessary to 
provide appropriate responses. In theory, thousands of specifications can be configured 
with VRDM to create a comprehensive security implementation. 
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IV. TEST AND DISCUSSION 
An information configuration was constructed with VRDM in the GINA 
framework. The simple configuration was devised as a tool for cyber threat analysis.  
A. APPARATUS 
Based on the CTRC exemplar, it was possible to create a pseudo-cognitive CTR 
system based on suspicion derived from multiple disparate information systems using 
process control configurations within the GINA framework environment. Virtualization 
is a relatively new means of testing this theory with little cost and deployment time and it 
was used as the underlying architecture for the evaluation. It was relatively simple to 
create disparate network data sources and use a VRDM specification to aggregate those 
data sources. Appendices A, B, C, D, and E provide detailed implementation instructions 
for the CTRC. A test environment was created that utilized public IP address space and 
industry standard software. My intent was to determine if a VRDM information 
configuration was capable of network threat detection without programming. 
The test network was protected by industry standard HIDS, NIDS, and Antivirus. 
Snort active response was not employed. IDS active response would have undermined the 
weighted decision configuration and is vulnerable to false positive DoS. The objective 
was to evaluate the effectiveness of a CTRC as a method of analyzing network threats 
and intrusions in addition to standard network protection. An Apache webserver hosted a 
PHPMyAdmin site and had no protection other than Snort as a network packet capture 
component. Real attacks from unknown Internet hackers were collected over the course 
of three months. VRDM was used to detect network attacks through analysis of Vector-
related data derived from syslogs, weblogs, and packet capture. The CTRC network 




 VRDM SoS network interaction concept. Consists of a DMZ Figure 32. 
(red) and a protection SoS controlled by a GINA server (blue). 
A GINA server in blue could send SSH commands to the 
various network components and initiate command line 
reconfigurations of group policy and registry keys. The system 
could send emails from the DNN environment and populate 
text files for reporting. Logs were automatically generated by 
the CTRC. 
 83 
Materials used to create the servers required for the cyber threat analysis system 
consisted of salvaged computer components of about six years of age. The CTR 
prototype system was constructed in a virtual environment with a single server. A Dell 
PowerEdge SC1430 configuration was used with VM Ware ESXi 4. The server contained 
16 GB of DDR2 ECC FB Registered RAM, two quad core Xeon 2.33ghz processors, one 
3Ware 9560SE hardware RAID controller, three 1 TB 7.5K SATA3/gbs hard drives in a 
RAID 5 configuration, and two gigabit NICs. The total price of the server was $550. The 
server contained eight virtual machines including 
 Router—Debian Linux based Vyatta software router. 
 Scanner—Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 hosting NMAP 6, ScanPBNJ (a 
NMAP database solution) and MySQL 5 with MySQL Workbench. 
 GINA IIS server—MS Windows 2008 server and IIS 6.0 hosting a website 
loaded with the “dotnetnuke” environment hosting the Global Information 
Network Architecture front end. In addition to the DOD certified GINA, 
this server also contains a copy of Plink (a lightweight SSH scripting tool), 
Event Scavenger 5 (a database enabled Windows event logger), and 
Runas.exe. 
 GINA SQL server—MS Windows 2008 server and SQL Server 2008 
hosting the GINA back end databases. In addition to the DOD-certified 
GINA, this server also contains an ODBC driver. 
 Snort sensor—MS Windows 2008 and Snort 2.9.2.2 with MSSQL 
integrated support. 
 Snort SQL—MS Windows 2008 and SQL server hosting the database for 
Snort full packet captures and alerts. 
 Apache Web Server—Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 hosting Apache 2.0 
with “mod-dbd” plugin and PHPMyAdmin installed. 
 Apache MySQL—Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 hosting MySQL 5 with 
MySQL Workbench installed. 
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 This virtual test environment consisted of eight virtual Figure 33. 
machines all running on a Dell Poweredge SC1430. The green 
lines indicate Internet connectivity, the black lines indicate 
intranet connectivity, and the red lines indicate direct 
connections. 
1. Cyber threat analysis 
VRDM linked five databases on four virtual machines into a common 
environment and executed SSH commands on a Vyatta router. Connections to a Linux 
rsyslog database, Windows Event Scavenger event database, NMAP PBNJ scanner 
database, Apache Mod-DBD web log database, and a Snort packet capture and alert 
database were created without modifying the code of any of the systems. Each system 
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used a standard MSSQL or MySQL backend database and was integrated through those 
databases vice the front end application programming interface (API). GINA could 
execute commands and use Element values from any system to construct command line 
arguments and SSH commands.  
Tor data collection was automated to continuously connect to new entry and exit 
nodes then connect to the honeypot Apache server and request information. Snort packet 
capture recorded packet data to a CTRC-integrated database. Tor exit nodes were 
automatically scanned as a service process and recorded open port information to a 
CTRC integrated database. Over two thousand Tor connections were attempted and over 
a thousand Tor servers were scanned and enumerated. Only half of the Tor exit nodes 
were listed in the public exit node list. A simple CTRC was configured to detect and flag 
any two part combination of PHPMyAdmin web requests, directory traversal scanning, 
and Tor obfuscation. The configuration was capable of detecting and responding to the 
common pattern of the PHPMyAdmin attack.  
Several unsolicited attacks were detected by the CTRC. CTRC active response 
was disabled in order to allow an attacker to continue attacks without the necessity of 
altering his IP address. A simple form was created where web server attacks were listed 
in an authority window in the context of IP addresses from the Apache database. A 
collection window displayed relative packet data for the socket pair from the Snort 
database. A third collection window displayed results from an NMAP scan of the IP 
address. All three data sources in the same window demonstrated the simplicity and rapid 
implementation of network analysis using VRDM. The analysis configuration used 
machine logic to determine a threat. The result was an extensible differential diagnosis 
investigation configuration that used a set of decisions that together increase the prospect 
of threat detection and lowered the likelihood of false positives. 
Additional analysis of the attacks revealed that the same IP address that was 
sending PHPMyAdmin attacks to the Apache server was also creating several audit 
failures in the “Event Scavenger” security event logs of the GINA IIS server. Repeated 
audit failures was evidence that an attacker was trying password combinations in rapid 
succession to brute force break into a remote desktop protocol (RDP) connection. There 
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was no success audit in the logs for that IP address. The same IP address created a 
success audit on another system. The attacker apparently guessed the password of the 
CTRC console laptop. A simple password was chosen for ease of access during testing. 
The attacker left no evidence of his presence other than having enabled the built-in guest 
account, gave it full administrative control, added it to the remote desktop security group, 
disabled the windows firewall, and disabled security event logging. Events were not 
recorded after the breach and the attacker’s RDP sessions were encrypted. As a result, 
little is known about the extent of the attack.  
Correlation with a “Scan PBNJ” record of the culprit IP address revealed that the 
source IP address was running a web service. Browsing the website revealed it belonged 
to the German government. The difference between the packet capture calculated round 
trip time and the ping reply round trip was nearly fourfold. The disparity is evidence that 
the attacker was using the server as a proxy for his attacks. A configuration to 
automatically detect this type of abuse can be rapidly configured in VRDM in the same 
manner as the CTRC. It is important to note that the compromised system was only 
discovered because of a PHPMyAdmin attack against an Apache honeypot server two 
steps removed from the laptop. The laptop and servers gave no warning that an attacker 
was guessing RDP passwords even though the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) 
standard Symantec Endpoint Protection was installed, updated, and running on the laptop 
with all Windows patches applied.  
B. RESULTS 
Over the course of three months, the network was attacked by 27 IP addresses and 
compromised by one. The breach was detected by using relationships between web logs, 
event logs, and packet captures. The relationships revealed that the same attacker who 
was guessing passwords on one server without success succeeded when guessing 
passwords on the GINA console laptop. Attackers were likely attracted to the honeypot 
because the server was listed on a hacker search engine as vulnerable (Figure 34). 
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<Break for brevity>  
 
 
 A Google search of my web server IP address proved that Figure 34. 
automated crawlers index servers for vulnerabilities. The 
image from http://un1c0rn.net/host/207.140.106.47 showed 
database name, table names, and the user account of the web 
server. 
The CTRC demonstrated the possibility of implementing an expert analyst 
process configuration in the GINA environment using VRDM. This configuration used 
commonalities of known PHPMyAdmin attacks to predict and mitigate the effects of new 
and unknown attacks. Simply downloading a Tor exit node IP list and uploading that list 
into a router ACL block list did not protect against unknown anonymity network traffic 
because half the Tor nodes tested were not on the block list. An anonymity detection 
sequence was proven necessary to detect obfuscated addresses.  
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This thesis reviewed the current cyber threat state, cyber defense technologies, 
systems integration problems, VRDM concepts, and proposed a cyber threat response 
configuration for PHPMyAdmin threat analysis. VRDM worked well to integrate several 
cyber security products into a single common cyber picture. Full systems integration was 
completed in a graphical user interface without modifying the code of any component 
system. All data sources were normalized with VRDM and integrated as a single all 
source system of systems. 
The system components were chosen for functionality with no regard for 
interoperability. System integration was entirely configured from within the GINA 
framework. Integration between system components and network hardware was 
accomplished using a combination of the framework’s command line execution feature, 
batch commands, and a command line SSH interpreter. As a result, network traffic 
collection, detection, analysis, and response could be entirely controlled from within a 
VRDM configuration.  
The prototype CTRC developed here can be extended through configuration to 
evolve with current threat state. VRDM utilized the combined functionality of supporting 
systems, however each system must be configured appropriately according its own 
requirements. VRDM proved capable of integrating cyber threat response systems and 
performing operations on integrated datasets. A benefit of this approach was that 
additional data sources and systems could be integrated into the system through a 
configuration change to the information configuration. This required no additional 
programming and relatively little time. The framework’s integrated command line feature 
could manipulate many external network systems and invoke SSH-enabled 
reconfiguration of those network systems.  
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B. FUTURE WORK 
VRDM can be applied on a larger scale to detect insider threats that are not under 
the purview of traditional NIDS and firewalls. There are many products that can be 
deployed and combined with VRDM to detect network intrusion and host configuration 
modification. VRDM can be of greater value if used to aggregate HIDS, net flow data, 
and session data from campus area network (CAN) Layer 2 and 3 devices to detect 
insider threats. Similar suspicion specifications can be configured to characterize the 
myriad of insider threat behaviors. SSH commands can be used to impede insider threats 
using active response by instantly blocking certain TCP ports and switch ports on a wide 
range of manageable Layer 2 devices when a breach is detected. Integration of databases 
for event logs, system logs, web logs, packet captures, antivirus events, and HIDS events 
can be rapidly correlated within a VRDM configuration. A process specification can be 
used as a tool to perform relational investigations of suspicious network events. This tool 
can decrease the time it takes to identify malicious entities operating on a network. 
Specifications can be developed to modify the configuration of HIDS, host based 
firewalls, local security policy, and group policy in rapid response to these insider threats. 
VRDM information configurations can aggregate “hacker” tools into a composite system. 
The intrusion sequence of scanning, enumeration, gaining access, and escalating privilege 
can be automated with an executable configuration. Multiple “hacker” tools such as 
Nessus, Metasploit, Netcat, Brutus, and NMAP can form a powerful composite tool for 
computer network attack (CNA). The implementation of an expert process control 
specification for network defense is similar to a process control specification for CNA. A 
process control specification that uses common hacker tools integrated into a VRDM 
could be an effective tool for cyber intrusion.  
VRDM can be taught quickly to an army of cyber warriors, providing them with 
knowledge of how to configure information from any technology or domain into a mission 
process. This would enable cyber subject matter experts to transform the data in static log 
files into actionable information and allow automated process to be rapidly configured 
according to a mission’s or subject matter expert’s specific CONOPs. The technology can 
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be used to rapidly deploy threat analysis and cyber hunting specifications at the enterprise 
level without costly programmer education and complex correlation engines.  
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APPENDIX A. SNORT DATABASE LOGGING IMPLEMENTATION 
Snort is capable of full packet capture with integrated database functionality. 
Supported databases are MSSQL, MySQL, Oracle, Postgres, and ODBC. I installed Snort 
version 2.9.0 for the integrated MSSQL capability. Newer versions of Snort require 
BarnYard2 that operates as an add-on spooler, which receives data from Snort and sends 
the data to databases. 
 
Procedure: 
1. Install winpcap on the sensor (a Snort prerequisite) 
2. Install Snort 2.9.0 on the sensor - The Snort 2.9.0 installer creates a folder of 




 Earlier versions of Snort have this database option during Figure 35. 
install. This step in the install process creates the output plugin 
and database schema file for database logging. Newer versions 
do not have this option because they are integrated with 
Barnyard that communicates directly with SQL servers. 
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3. SQL code is saved in c:\snort\schemas\create_mssql.sql at setup completion. 
When the code is executed on a SQL server, all required tables for Snort access 
are created in the database. 
4. Configure Snort for database logging 
i) SQL Server 2008 is installed on MS Server 2008 enterprise 
ii) Open SQL Management Studio and open a “new query” window.  
Add the following: 
iii) create database snort_db 
iv) go 
v) use snort_db 
vi) go 




 MSSQL Server Management Studio is the graphical user Figure 36. 
environment database management. This graphic shows that a 
snort-db database was created as a result of the 
create_mssql.sql schema code. 
viii) Grant all permissions to a snort user on the database (for simplicity). 
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5. Snort must have these commands in snort.conf 
i) output log_tcpdump: /Snort/log/tcpdump.log 
ii) output database: log, mssql, user=snort password=Password!! dbname=snort_db 
host=snort encoding=ascii 
iii) log IP any any -> any any; 
 
 The Snort.conf file contains only the lines necessary to log a Figure 37. 
full packet capture to the database. Rules and alerts are also 
defined in this file. 
6. Start Snort - capture and populate the database by typing the following 
commands. 
i) Snort –W  shows interfaces 
ii) Snort - i 1 -vd -c c:\snort\snort.conf  
iii) Data will immediately populate the database. To see the bottom rows in SQL, 




 MSSQL database is populated with packet capture as soon as Figure 38. 
Snort is started. Snort will not start if the database is not 
properly configured or is offline. 
 97 
APPENDIX B. APACHE LOGGING IMPLEMENTATION 
Apache was chosen as a network attack target in order to demonstrate that 
unusual requests to PHPMyAdmin can be investigated computationally by specifying a 
reasonable human decision making process. The majority of web servers are Linux based 
and it is reasonable to assume that there is greater attack surface for them. The threat 
detection specification may also be applied to Microsoft IIS servers, but it would limit 
platform diversity for the experiment. Apache is loaded on an instance of Red Hat 
Enterprise Linux 6 with PHPMyAdmin as a honeypot. Apache database modules include 
mod-dbd, apr-dbd, mod-log-dbd, and mod-vhost-dbd.  
 
Install procedure from RHEL6 terminal: 
1. Subscribe to software repositories 
i) yum install http://centos.alt.ru/repository/centos/5/x86_64/apr-util-1.4.1–
1.el5.x86_64.rpm 
ii) yum install http://yum.jasonlitka.com/EL5/x86_64/apr-util-1.3.9–
1.jason.2.x86_64.rpm 
iii) yum install http://mirror.centos.org/centos/6/os/x86_64/Packages/apr-util-mysql-
1.3.9–3.el6_0.1.x86_64.rpm 
2. Install software dependencies with the following commands in a terminal 
emulator 
i) yum install httpd-devel –y 
ii) yum install mysql-server mysql –y 
iii) yum install phpMyAdmin –y 
iv) yum upgrade mysql –y 
v) yum install httpd –y 
vi) yum install python-abi –y 
vii) yum install python-crypto –y 
viii) yum install python-paramiko –y 
ix) yum install ftp://ftp.muug.mb.ca/mirror/centos/6.5/os/x86_64/Packages/libzip-
0.9–3.1.el6.x86_64.rpm -y 
x) yum install http://dev.mysql.com/get/Downloads/MySQLGUITools/mysql-
workbench-community-6.0.9–1.el6.x86_64.rpm -y 
xi) wget https://dbd-modules.googlecode.com/files/dbd-modules-1.0.6.zip 
unzip dbd-modules-1.0.6.zip 
xii) apxs -c mod_vhost_dbd.c 
xiii) apxs -i mod_vhost_dbd.la 
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xiv) apxs -c mod_log_dbd.c 
xv) apxs -i mod_log_dbd.la 
3. Configure httpd.conf – The sequential order of the directives matter 
i) LoadModule dbd_module modules/mod_dbd.so 
ii) LoadModule log_dbd_module modules/mod_log_dbd.so 
iii) DBDriver mysql 
iv) DBDParams “host=ApacheSql port=3306 dbname=apache user=root 
pass=Password1 
v) CustomLog logs/access.sql “%{%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S}t, %a, %{remote}p, 
%U, %H, %f, %B, %m, %p, %>s, %{%s}t” 
vi) DBDLog logs/access.sql “INSERT INTO Apache_log(Tstmp, RemoteIP, 
RemotePort, URL, Protocol, Filename, Bytes, Method, SvrPort, Status, Epoch) 
Values (%s, %s, %s, %s, %s, %s, %s, %s, %s, %s, %s)” 
vii) *NOTE* your MySQL database must have a database named apache with a table 
named “Apache_log” with columns: Tstmp, RemoteIP, RemotePort, URL, 
Protocol, Filename, Bytes, Method, SvrPort, Status, Epoch 
 
 The salient portions of an Apache database logging solution Figure 39. 
are shown in the web server configuration file (httpd.conf). 
The order of the directives matter because the plugins are 
interdependent.  
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2. Restart server then start services: 
i) service mysqld start 
ii) service httpd start 
3. Test the database by opening a browser window to URL 
http://127.0.0.1/phpmyadmin 
4. The database will immediately populate: 
 
 
 Logs from database access are inserted into the database in Figure 40. 
real time. The database can log as many different attributes as 
allowed by the combined log format of the Apache server. 
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APPENDIX C. NMAP SCANNER WITH DATABASE 
In order to collect maximum intelligence on a source connection, it is generally 
necessary to stimulate a response from a source address. Even if it is nothing more than 
determining a connection did not truly originate from its purported source. There are 
multiple software titles available to provide the functionality such as McAfee’s 
SuperScan or Gordon Lyon’s NMAP security scanner. In order to integrate the benefits 
of port scanning and network enumeration into an extended common network picture, the 
software must be capable of sending scan results into a database that can be related to 
IDS generated packet captures and transaction data. Database logging is possible with 
programs such as NMAP-DBD, ScanPBNJ, as well as simply exporting scan results into 
an XML format readable by GINA. A Security Onion server instance inherently includes 
NMAP and MySQL. It required little modification to provide ScanPBNJ services. 
Procedure for cyber scanner: 
1. Install Security Onion – The ISO is downloadable from 
http://sourceforge.net/projects/security-onion/. The security architecture includes 
NMAP and MySQL. 
2. Install ScanPBNJ - This is simply done by typing the commands in the Security 
Onion terminal emulator. 
i) sudo apt-get install pbnj 
ii) mkdir ~/.pbnj-2.0 
iii) cp /usr/share/doc/pbnj/examples/mysql.yaml ~/.pbnj-2.0/config.yaml *NOTE: 
~/.pbnj-2.0/config.yaml is where ScanPBNJ references by default 
3. Set up database 
i) mysql –u root –p nosman 
ii) create database scanpbnj 
iii) grant select, insert, update, create on pbnjdb.* to ‘pbnjuser’@’localhost’ 
identified by ‘pbnj’ 
iv) sudo apt-get mysql-workbench 
4. Update ScanPBNJ configuration file 
i) sudo apt-get gedit 
ii) gedit ~/.pbnj-2.0/config.yamil 




 ScanPBNJ uses the YAML program to communicate with a Figure 41. 
MySQL database and must be configured in ./pbnj-
2.0/config.yaml.  
5. Test ScanPBNJ 
i) scanPBNJ localhost 
ii) scanPBNJ 184.168.221.83 
iii) mysql-workbench  




 The ScanPBNJ Database populates two tables: Machines and Figure 42. 
Services. The Services table has a many to one relationship to 
the Machines table and enumerates the services in operation 
per each IP address. 
6. Configure Security Onion firewall to allow external communication with port 
3306.  (For testing purposes, I simply turned off the firewall) 
i) Sudo ufw stop 
7. Configure MySQL to allow external communication with the database 
i) Allow MySQL to bind external addresses for database communication 
ii) Sudo gedit /etc/mysql/my.cnf 
iii) put a # before the skip-external-locking (sometimes skip-networking) 




 Communication to a MySQL database is locally specific by Figure 43. 
default. In order to allow a GINA server to communicate, the 
/etc/mysql/my.cnf file must be modified. 
8. Grant permission to GINA to access the scanner database: 
i) mysql –u root –p<password> *** NOTE: no space after the –p *** 
ii) CREATE USER ‘root’@’<GINA-SQL IP>‘ IDENTIFIED BY ‘<password>‘; 
iii) GRANT ALL PRIVILEGES ON * . * TO ‘root’@’<GINA-SQL IP>‘ 
IDENTIFIED BY ‘<password>‘ WITH GRANT OPTION 
iv) Setup of the three databases is complete.  
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APPENDIX D. EVENTLOG AND SYSLOG DATABASES 
Event Scavenger is an open source program that can parse Windows events into a 
database. Event Reaper is a commercial program that performs the same task. The 
website for both products has install procedures and user documentation. Rsyslog is the 
Linux equivalent and has native database logging capabilities. 
1. Download Event Scavenger from 
http://eventscavenger.codeplex.com/releases/view/120265 
2. Prior to following the directions at 
http://eventscavenger.codeplex.com/wikipage?title=Installation%20and%20Set%
20up&referringTitle=Documentation , create a folder on MSSQL server named 
c:\mssql\data2008 
3. The database is created with “createdatabase.cmd” and the database properties 
and schema are defined in six included SQL files that are each executed by 
“createdatabase.cmd.” 
 
 The EventScavenger files are listed on the left and the result of Figure 44. 
the installation script is shown in SQL Server Management 
Studio on the right. A MSSQL database is added to the Snort 
database (for simplicity) and event tables are created. 
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 EventScavenger was configured to send event data to the Figure 45. 
Snort database server because an instance of MSSQL existed 
and could be reused. An additional source was defined in 
GINA using the same database Connection. 
4. Rsyslog is an integrated Redhat Linux syslog program used to log Linux system 
events. I configured the rsyslog database on the Apache log database for 
simplicity.   
i) yum install rsyslog-mysql 
ii) The rsyslog-mysql package includes a file /usr/share/doc/rsyslog-mysql-
5.8.10/createDB.sql. Execute the created.sql query in mysql-workbench to build 
the database schema. 
 
 The creation of the database schema can be done by copying Figure 46. 
and pasting the created.sql code into a query window in 
mysql-workbench. 
iii) gedit /etc/rsyslog.conf 
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iv) Insert at top:   $Modload onmysql 
v) Insert:   *.* :onmysql:<DatabaseServerIP>,<TableName>,<User>,<Pass> 
vi) service rsyslog restart 
 
 The /etc/rsyslog.conf file defines the credentials for logging to Figure 47. 
a database and what should be logged. In the above example 
*.* means log everything. 
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APPENDIX E. GINA 
GINA consists of IIS, DNN, and MSSQL server and has add on components 
including ODBC drivers, runas.exe and Plink. To implement this configuration do the 
following: 
1. Perform a standard IIS installation 
2. Perform a standard Dot Net Nuke installation 
3. Perform a standard GINA installation – Refer to the GINA installation guide  
4. Install ODBC Driver into Windows IIS – A MySQL ODBC driver is required for 
MySQL connectivity and a specific connection in GINA. The ODBC must be 
installed on the GINA IIS server. Procedure: 
i) Obtain the MySQL ODBC driver from 
http://dev.mysql.com/downloads/connector/odbc/  (This driver should be installed 
on the IIS server). 
ii) *NOTE: Use the 32 bit program for a 32 bit install of GINA (this is the IIS. Even 
though I am using a 64 bit Linux MySQL server, 32 but is the correct choice. 64 
bit will not work on 32 bit GINA installs. 
iii) Run the ODBC program c:\Windows\SysWOW64\ODBCAD32.exe 
 
 
 The ODBC configuration manager is located on the GINA IIS Figure 48. 
server. It contains configuration details for all ODBC 
connections to remote databases. 
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iv) Click the system DSN tab 
 
 The ODBC data source administrator creates data sources for Figure 49. 
each ODBC connection. Each “Name” of a data source is the 
“table” name in a VRDM Source configuration. The ODBC 
connection is transparent to a GINA Source. 
v) Click add and select MySQL ODBC 5.2 Unicode Driver 
 
 ODBC Drivers are specified in the data source, once the Figure 50. 
MySQL ODBC driver program from 5 i) was executed, the 
driver automatically populated in this window. 
vi) Parameters required are data source name, TCP/IP address of the remote server, 
the port number of the remote database service, the username and password, and 




 The mysql driver includes an interface for configuring Figure 51. 
connection parameters. The test button verifies connectivity 
from the GINA IIS server to the remote mysql database. 
vii) When you click test you may get this: 
 
 Connection errors are common in system integrations. It is Figure 52. 
important to ensure that access authorization is granted before 
configuring a connection. 
viii) When this happens you must specify permissions on the MySQL server. 
5. Apply permissions to SQL server for remote access. 
Procedure: 
i) mysql –u root –p<password here with no space after the -p> 
ii) CREATE USER ‘<username>‘@’<gina server IP address>‘ IDENTIFIED BY 
‘password’; 
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 Access permissions can be granted by both command line and Figure 53. 
the mysql-workbench GUI. 
iv) Attempt a test in the ODBC connector configuration [Test] button 
 
 
 An ODBC test success message is the proper result of this Figure 54. 
configuration 
6. A GINA source for the ODBC connector is required 
Procedure: 




 GINA database access codes are saved in a MSSQL table. Figure 55. 
MSSQL supports SSL and IPSec to secure the credentials in 
transit. 





 This GINA database connection specifies the connection name Figure 56. 
from the ODBC connector as the location instead of a server 
name or IP address. In effect, a local connection is made to the 
ODBC driver and the driver forwards the requests to a remote 
mysql server. 




 The Source defines the table in the remote database and gives Figure 57. 
it a friendly name for the VRDM environment. Here, the 
Apache_log table is named Apachelogs. 
iv) The source can be referenced by X-types inside the GINA framework. 
7. Install plink – Plink can be downloaded from 
http://the.earth.li/~sgtatham/putty/latest/x86/plink.exe. It is a small and simple 
program that does not require complicated installation procedures. 
8. Database format standardization 
 Snort saves IP addresses to MSSQL Server as a coded decimal. When converted 
to hexadecimal, every two hex characters convert to an octet of the standard IPv4 dotted 
quad format. There are considerably more tuples in the Snort database per each tuple in 
the apache and NMAP databases. It is therefore more advantageous to convert the dotted 
quad address in the Apache and NMAP tables to coded decimal that matches the Snort 
tables. Lookup operations on the Snort database are more efficient in the native coded 
decimal format. A SQL “View” applied to the IP address columns of the Apache and 
MySQL databases. Logging database works well to perform the conversions.  
Procedure to apply a view to convert dotted quad to coded decimal: 
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i) Open MySQL workbench 
ii) Right click on “views” in the left navigation pane 
iii) Code: 
view ‘IPConvert’ AS select ‘Apache_log’.’RemoteIP’ as ‘RemoteIP’, 
inet_aton(‘Apache_log’.’RemoteIP’) as ‘value’ from ‘Apache_log’; 
 
 A view is simple in MySQL. Once a view is created, VRDM Figure 58. 
can access the view as if it were a persistent data source. 
inet_aton is a function that converts a dotted quad IP address 
to a coded decimal (the same format as Snort logs IP addresses 
to databases.  
iv) View conversion results 
 
 The MySQL view shows the IP address conversion from Figure 59. 
dotted quad to coded decimal. 
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